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One of the oldest debates in American jurisprudence concerns the concept of
“proximate cause.” According to so-called formalists, the legal concept of proximate
cause is the same as the ordinary concept of “cause.” The legal question of whether a
cause is proximate for the purposes of establishing tort liability, therefore, is an objective matter about the external world determinable by familiar descriptive inquiry.
By contrast, legal realists think that issues of proximate causation are disguised
normative questions about responsibility. As the realists William Prosser and
W. Page Keeton put it, proximate cause is better called “responsible cause.”
Recent work in cognitive science has afforded us new insights into the way people make causal judgments that were unavailable at the time of the original debate
between formalists and realists. We now have access to the results of systematic experimental studies that examine the way people ordinarily think about causation
and morality. This work opens up the possibility of a very different approach to understanding the role of causation in the law—one which combines the attractive features of both formalism and realism without accepting their implausible
consequences.
In addition to providing a model for interpreting the case law of proximate
cause, this Article also introduces a new way of doing legal theory—a method we
call “experimental jurisprudence.” Experimental jurisprudence is the study of jurisprudential questions using empirical methods. Jurisprudential disputes about proximate cause are especially ripe for empirical analysis because the debate revolves
around whether the legal concept of proximate cause is the same as the ordinary
concept of causation. Interrogating the ordinary concept of causation, therefore,
should shed light on this question.
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INTRODUCTION
A few days before Christmas 1924, William Markowitz sold
an air rifle to Richard Kevans. Markowitz should not have made
that sale. Richard Kevans was only thirteen years old and New
York state law explicitly prohibited selling air rifles and ammunition “to an infant under the age of 16.”1 When Richard’s mother
found out, she demanded that he return the gun to Markowitz’s
shop. When Markowitz refused to take the rifle back, Richard’s
mother hid it, intending to return it to her boy when he was older.2
Six months later, Richard discovered the secreted rifle. He
went down to a cellar with his friend, taking turns shooting a paper target placed over a hole in the cellar door. Unfortunately, a
shot sailed through the target and hit Charles Henningsen, a
seven-year-old boy who was playing on the steps on the opposite

1
Henningsen v. Markowitz, 230 N.Y.S. 313, 313 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (citing N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 1896 (1911)).
2
Id. at 314.
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side of the cellar door. Charles lost all sight in his left eye.
Charles’s father sued Markowitz for negligently selling a rifle to
a minor and was awarded $23,000 in damages by the court.3
The defendant had claimed that his actions were not the
proximate cause of the infant’s injury.4 In deciding the issue in
Henningsen v. Markowitz,5 the New York Supreme Court relied
on the following test: “[W]here defendant’s active force has come
to rest in a position of apparent safety, the court will follow it no
longer; if some new force later combines with this condition to
create harm, the result is remote from defendant’s act.”6
Despite the interventions of Richard, Richard’s mother, Richard’s friend, and Charles, the court held that the shop owner’s
“active force” had not yet “come to rest.”7 Markowitz’s wrongdoing
“continued to be potentially active” for those many months and
subsequent intervening actions only served to unleash the “force
which defendant had set in motion.”8
One need not be suspicious to be skeptical of this opinion. One
reason to doubt that the court faithfully recorded its reasoning is
the evident obfuscation. What precisely is an “active” force? How
is an active force different from a “potentially active” force? And
when exactly does an active force “come to rest in a position of
apparent safety” and thus become “remote”? Since the test is inscrutable, it is difficult to see how the court could have actually
used it as a premise in its reasoning.
Second, as the legal realist Leon Green argued, the opinion
used the test in an inconsistent manner.9 The court borrowed the
test from Professor Joseph Beale, the famed Harvard formalist,
as set out in his well-known article, The Proximate Consequences
of an Act.10 But, as Green pointed out, Beale applied his test very
differently.11 In the same article where the borrowed test is formulated, Beale considers a case that is almost perfectly on point: “[I]f
the explosive gets into the hands of an adult the defendant’s force
3

Id. at 317.
Id. at 315.
5
230 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
6
Id. at 316 (quoting Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33
HARV. L. REV. 633, 651 (1920)).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601,
623 (1929).
10 Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633,
651 (1920).
11 Green, supra note 9, at 622–23.
4
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has ceased to be an active danger; if the explosive thereafter gets
into the hands of a child, defendant is not the proximate cause of
anything this child may do with it.”12 Having adopted Beale’s test,
the court failed to adopt Beale’s application of his own test.
There is a third reason not to take the court’s purported
formalism at face value. The decision that the court reached—
namely, to hold the criminal gun seller financially responsible13—
seems like the correct resolution of the case from the moral point
of view. The defendant, after all, acted irresponsibly, and it was
morally appropriate for him to compensate the innocent victim.
The court’s ruling, in other words, is the decision one would have
expected if the court were chiefly concerned with satisfying the
demands of justice, not with hewing to the byzantine logic of
formalism.
The confluence of these factors—obfuscation, inconsistency
and acceptability—strongly suggests that the court did not take
its own formalist rhetoric seriously. It is far more plausible to believe that the court ruled as it did because it judged the gun dealer
to have acted reprehensibly. In this regard, Henningsen is not
unique. Cases involving issues of proximate causation are among
the most challenging to interpret literally. As Professor Clarence
Morris noted in 1939, expressing the frustration of many torts
professors: “The preceptor who aims to teach his students what
courts will or should do, finds the chapter on causation a nightmare.”14 The better explanation usually assumes that courts are
covertly making moral judgments about the actions in question
and are basing their decisions about proximate causation on
them.
We are persuaded that formalism is not an acceptable interpretation of the law or of judicial behavior in proximate causation
cases. Despite the rhetoric of the opinions, questions of proximate
causation are not exclusively descriptive; they are often deeply
normative. But we are not ready to succumb to the siren call of

12 Beale, supra note 10, at 656; see also, e.g., Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Horton, 113
S.W. 647, 649 (Ark. 1908) (holding that a mother granting permission to her child to play
with a dynamite cap—despite neither of them recognizing it as such—broke the causal
chain and rendered the company that originally possessed the cap not liable).
13 See Henningsen, 230 N.Y.S. at 317.
14 Clarence Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1088
(1939); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737
(1985) (“In all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive
as the causation requirement.”).
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the legal realist. For the realist holds a position that we believe
to be extreme.
Legal realists, as we understand them, do not simply deny
that the doctrine of proximate causation is descriptive in nature.
Realists actually deny that there is a distinct doctrine of proximate
causation. Though courts in criminal law and torts cases act as
though there is such a principle, no such legal norm actually exists. On the realist construal, judges trot out this pseudoprinciple
as an exercise in indirection. Rather than being used as a premise
in their arguments about legal responsibility, the role of this
pseudoprinciple is to disguise the moral judgment made by the
judge.
Properly understood, according to the realist, to say that X
proximately caused Y’s harm is merely to claim that X is legally
responsible for Y’s harm. Thus, Green claimed, “the inquiry while
stated in what seems to be terms of cause is in fact whether the
defendant should be held responsible.”15 Professors William
Prosser and W. Page Keeton put the point even more bluntly:
“‘[R]esponsible cause’ would be a more appropriate term” than
proximate cause.16 Appearances to the contrary, then, legal claims
of proximate cause are not premises in judicial reasoning, but rather conclusions of such reasoning.
We argue that this extreme position is not warranted. Legal
realists have made a strong case for the claim that judgments of
proximate causation are sometimes influenced by moral judgments. One should not conclude, however, that the whole notion
of proximate causation is just a smokescreen that plays no real
role in judicial reasoning. There is an alternative.
Recent work in cognitive science has afforded us new insights
into the way people make causal judgments that were unavailable at the time of the original debate between formalists and realists. We now have access to the results of systematic experimental studies that examine the way people ordinarily think
about causation and morality. As we argue, this work opens up
the possibility of a very different approach to understanding the
role of causation in the law—one which combines the attractive
features of both formalism and realism without accepting their
implausible consequences.

15

Green, supra note 9, at 605 (emphasis in original).
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984).
16
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As we show in Part I, the traditional formulation of the debate between realism and formalism is deeply misleading. The
traditional formulation assumes that there are two things—
causal judgments and moral judgments—and that the aim is to
understand the relation between them. Realists affirm and formalists deny that causal judgments are determined by moral
judgments.
The problem with this formulation is that it assumes that
there is a single monolithic thing called “moral judgment.” However,
there are many different kinds of moral judgments that people
are normally required to make. Faced with any given case, a person might judge that an act was morally wrong, that the agent
deserves blame, that the defendant should be liable. Though
these judgments are concerned in some way with moral questions,
the traditional formulation of the debate lumps them all together
in a single category. These different judgments are fundamentally different from each other, and they each need to be considered separately.
Once we recognize that there are different kinds of moral
judgments, we see a new possibility opens up:
Moral 1 à Cause à Moral 2
In other words, the suggestion is that moral judgments of one
type can influence causal judgments, but these causal judgments
then influence moral judgments of another type. Though the judgment on the left and the judgment on the right are both concerned
with moral questions, they are distinct judgments, which play
quite distinct roles in legal reasoning.
In Part II, we develop this possibility. On this proposal, the
goal is to arrive at a particular sort of moral judgment, namely, a
judgment as to whether the defendant should be held liable
(Moral 2). As one step along the path to arriving at this judgment,
people make judgments about whether the defendant was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury (Cause). This causal judgment is in turn influenced in part by an earlier moral judgment
(Moral 1), but importantly, this first moral judgment is not the
same sort of judgment as the one that people’s causal judgments
influence; it is a judgment of a fundamentally different type. We
will have a great deal more to say about this first judgment in
what follows, but for the moment, we just want to emphasize one
specific point about it. This first judgment is not a judgment about
whether the state should hold the defendant liable; it is concerned
entirely with the moral status of the defendant’s action itself (i.e.,
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with questions about whether this action was itself right or
wrong). Thus, on the view we will be developing, people’s judgments about whether the state should hold the defendant liable
are influenced by their causal judgments, which are in turn influenced by a judgment about the moral status of the defendant’s
action itself.
As we show, this possibility steers a middle ground between
the extremes of formalism and realism. On the formalist view, one
first makes the causal judgment and then uses this causal judgment as a premise in moral reasoning. On the realist view, one
first makes the moral judgment and then introduces a causal
judgment at the end just to offer some post hoc justification for
the moral judgment one has already made. On our proposal, one
first makes a moral judgment about moral rightness and wrongness.
Based on this judgment, one draws a causal judgment about proximate causation. Finally, on the basis of the causal judgment, one
draws a normative judgment about responsibility.
Ultimately, the only way to know whether this new model is
correct is to look at actual legal decisions and legal doctrines, and
we pursue that approach in Parts IV and V.
This Article not only attempts to breathe life into a tired debate about proximate causation, it also employs a new approach
to resolving jurisprudential controversies. We call this approach
“experimental jurisprudence.” Broadly speaking, experimental
jurisprudence aims to make progress on traditional questions
from analytic and normative jurisprudence but to do so using a
new method, namely, the use of systematic experimental studies.
Specifically, research in experimental jurisprudence uses empirical studies to explore the contours of legally relevant concepts.
The studies conducted for this Article were among the first to
use experimental methods to resolve jurisprudential questions.
Over the past few years, however, there has been an explosion of
similar research. Recent work has investigated a number of different legally relevant concepts, including the concepts of intention, responsibility, reasonableness—and of course the concept of
law itself.17 A key theme in this research has been the relationship

17 For recent studies that employ a similar experimental method, see generally, for example, Raff Donelson & Ivar R. Hannikainen, Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law
Revisited, in 3 OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 6 (Tania Lombrozo et al. eds.,
2020) (appraising Professor Lon Fuller’s procedural natural law theory); Markus Kneer &
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Mens Rea Ascription, Expertise and Outcome Effects: Professional
Judges Surveyed, 169 COGNITION 139 (2017) (ascertaining how professional judges ascribe
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between legal concepts and the corresponding ordinary concepts.
Thus, existing papers have compared the legal concept of intentional action to the ordinary concept of intentional action,18 the
legal concept of consent to the ordinary concept of consent,19 and
so forth. These studies suggest that many of the concepts often
thought to be distinctive to the law itself are best understood to
be drawn from folk psychology.
Indeed, an emerging consensus has arisen within experimental jurisprudence that Professor Kevin Tobia calls the “folk
law thesis.”20 According to the folk law thesis, legal concepts share
many, if not all, of the features of the corresponding ordinary concept.21 This Article lends further support to the folk law thesis.
Legal judgments of proximate cause, we aim to show, actually are
best understood as application of the very same criteria one finds
in the ordinary folk concept.
I. FORMALISM VERSUS REALISM
One of the most important functions of the law is to protect
the security of its subjects. Some areas—such as criminal law22
and administrative regulation23—protect that security even when
no harm has been inflicted. If I shoot at you and miss, I can be
convicted of attempted murder. Punishing attempts promotes the
physical security of the community by deterring additional attempts and condemning the very act of attempted homicide.

intentionality); James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory
Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957 (2019) (appraising how jury-eligible laypeople construe
causal language); Christian Mott, Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity, in 2 OXFORD
STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 243 (Tania Lombrozo et al. eds., 2018) (assessing
whether laypeople have an intuitive sense of a statute of limitations for legal punishment);
Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232 (2020) (investigating how
laypeople view consent); Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What Is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 293 (2018) (arguing for a hybrid standard of reasonableness that reflects ordinary people’s judgments).
18 See Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 17, at 140.
19 See Sommers, supra note 17, at 2247–48.
20 Kevin P. Tobia, Law and the Cognitive Science of Ordinary Concepts, in
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES (forthcoming).
21 Id.
22 E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 11.1(b) (3d ed. 2017)
(“Providing punishment for solicitation aids in the prevention of the harm which would
result should the inducements prove successful.”).
23 E.g., CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1.12, at 16–17 (3d ed. 2010).
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Tort law, by contrast, protects security only when a wrong
committed ripens into a harm.24 If I shoot at you and miss, you
cannot sue me for intentional battery. Tort law permits the victim
to extract compensation from the tortfeasor only when the tortfeasor has harmed the victim. A plaintiff may recover damages,
in other words, only if the defendant breached his duty of care,
and this breach was the cause of the harm that resulted.25
Traditionally, legal scholars have factored tort law’s causation requirement into two components: factual and proximate
causation.26 Roughly speaking, an event is a factual cause of a
harm when it is causally relevant to the occurrence of the harm
in question.27 Thus, if I slip deadly poison into your beer and you
drink it, my action is the factual cause of your demise. If, however,
you spill the beer before drinking it and get hit by a bus as you go
to the store to get more beer, then my action was not a factual
cause of your death because it did not contribute to the harm you
suffered.
Being a factual cause is not sufficient for an event to be a
legal cause. In addition, the event must be proximate to the
harm.28 A factual cause is a proximate cause when its causal relevance is either of sufficient strength or bears the right relation
to the harm to engender legal responsibility. Poisoning you is a
proximate cause of your death; but the doctor’s delivery of me as
a baby would not be. For even though the doctor’s actions played
some causal role in your eventual poisoning, and hence is a factual cause of your death, the doctor’s actions are too remote to
constitute the legal cause of the harm.
Most legal theorists accept that factual causation is factual.
Whether an event is causally relevant to the production of some
other event is taken to be an objective, descriptive matter. The
standard test for factual causation exemplifies its descriptive,
nonnormative character. According to the traditional formulation,
factual causation is a but-for relation: X factually causes Y if Y

24 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (noting an actor
is liable in tort for intentional physical harm only if the actor causes physical harm).
25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 39 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“[Liability is limited to when] there is a close connection between the breach of duty and the ensuing harm.”).
26 See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60 (1956).
27 See Jerry J. Phillips, Reflections on Factual Causation, 1978 W ASH . U. L.Q.
661, 662–63.
28 See Malone, supra note 26, at 66.
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would not have occurred but for the occurrence of X.29 My shooting
you in the heart is the factual cause of your death because you
would not have died had I not shot you in the heart. At least on
its face, the but-for relation (also known as the relation of counterfactual dependence30) appears to be a descriptive, objective
relation.31
Rather, the primary dispute in legal theory concerns proximate causation. Legal formalists accept, but legal realists deny,
that proximate causation is as factual as factual causation. The
formalist, in other words, thinks that the proximity or remoteness
of a factual cause is an objective matter about the external world,
determinable by familiar descriptive inquiry. It is as much a fact
about the world that the doctor’s delivery of me is not a proximate
cause of your death as my putting the poison in your drink is a
factual cause of the same event. By contrast, the legal realist
thinks that issues of proximate causation are normative questions about responsibility. We judge the doctor’s actions as too
causally remote from your death, according to the realist, because
it would be unfair to hold him responsible for my actions taken
many decades later.
In the Introduction, we examined some of the reasons why
legal realists have denied the facticity of proximate causation. As

29

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
The term was first introduced in David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556, 560–
61 (1973).
31 Some legal realists have taken an extreme position and have challenged the facticity
of factual causation. They have pointed out that factual causation in the law is sometimes
determined by counterfactual dependence and sometimes not. If my shooting coincides with
a sequoia falling on you, then my shooting is not the factual cause of your death—after all,
you would have died even if I did not shoot. But if I shoot you at the same time as another
person does, then both our actions are factual causes of the death even though had either of
us not shot, our victim still would have died. Critics have thus charged that factual causation
is not a dispassionate, objective inquiry about the world but a normative inquiry into responsibility. Overdetermination does not defeat factual causation in the latter case, on this view,
because justice would be offended if each actor escaped liability as a result of the other’s
wrongdoing. See, e.g., Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause (pt. 2), 72 U. PA. L. REV. 343, 347
(1924); Malone, supra note 26, at 67; see also Ingeborg Puppe & Richard W. Wright, Causation in the Law: Philosophy, Doctrine and Practice, in CAUSATION IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW
17, 17 (Marta Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni eds., 2017) (finding that some theorists “assert
that causation is never a purely objective, scientific issue”) (citing Marta Infantino, Causation Theories and Causation Rules, in COMPARATIVE TORT LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 279,
298 (Mauro Bussani & Anthony J. Sebok eds., 2015); Jonathan Schaffer, Contrastive Causation, 114 PHIL. REV. 327, 342–46, 348–49 (2005); WALTER VAN GERVEN, JEREMY F. LEVER &
PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 395 (2000); CHRISTIAN VON BAR, 2 THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW
OF TORTS 435–46, 461 (2000)).
30
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we saw, close readings of cases such as Henningsen strongly suggest that courts do not decide proximate causation cases in a
purely descriptive manner. The formalist tests that they set out
are so complex and hard to follow that it is doubtful that they are
ever used as stated. As Judge Henry Edgerton exclaimed after
examining Beale’s test and comparing it to the case law, “This is
complicated; it is ambiguous; it seems arbitrary; and the authorities do not drive us to it.”32
The realists also note that courts seem to take moral wrongness
into account when assigning proximate causation. The more culpable an action, the more likely a court will assign causation to
that action. “[T]he intentional wrongfulness, and still more the
criminality, which, as characteristics of the defendant’s act, tend
to lengthen the reach of legal cause, as characteristics of the intervening action tend to shorten it.”33 Thus, when a city maintained a dangerous excavation and the defendant negligently
forced the plaintiff into the ditch, the city was held to be the cause
of the harm;34 but when the plaintiff was intentionally pushed,
the deliberate wrongdoing was enough to break the causal chain
and hence the city was not held to be the proximate cause of the
injury.35 The more plausible explanation for these decisions, according to the realist, is that courts are following the dictates of
common sense morality: “A legal cause is a justly-attachable
cause . . . meaning by ‘just,’ not merely fair as between the parties, but socially advantageous, as serving the most important of
the competing individual and social interests involved.”36
The realist position on proximate causation is not only influenced by their close readings of the case law. Just as significantly,
it is motivated by the realist theory about the causes of judicial
behavior. On this psychological account, judges normally seek to
decide cases in accordance with their sense of justice and social

32

Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause (pt. 1), 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211, 223 (1924).
Edgerton, supra note 31, at 364.
34 Village of Carterville v. Cook, 22 N.E. 14, 15 (Ill. 1889).
35 Alexander v. Town of New Castle, 17 N.E. 200, 202 (Ind. 1888); Milostan v. City of
Chicago, 148 Ill. App. 540, 546–47 (1909).
36 Edgerton, supra note 31, at 348. Likewise, Judge William Andrews in his famous
dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), claimed: “What
we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a
certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.” Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
33
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utility.37 Even if legal doctrine required a decision that was unjust
or otherwise socially unacceptable, judges invariably interpret
the rules so that the “right” result “follows.”38 Judges, after all,
are people too, and seek to avoid injustice whenever possible.
Thus, in torts cases, courts invariably decide for the plaintiff
when they judge that the defendant is morally responsible for the
harm. Likewise, in criminal cases, judges affirm convictions when
they assess that the defendant is morally culpable and hence deserving of punishment.
The idea that judges decide cases in line with their moral
judgments had a profound effect on the realist rejection of the formalist interpretation of proximate causation. If judges seek to do
justice, why would they care about the arcane metaphysics of active forces and intervening causes? Professor Green ridiculed
these concerns as the preoccupations of “legal theology” and “medieval morality.”39 While he conceded that some courts did take
these metaphysical considerations seriously—memorably describing courts as according the causation doctrine “the same
sanctity that young children give to Santa Claus”40—he thought
that for the most part judges decide cases on a rational basis,
namely, on the policy considerations of justice and social utility.
“I am of the opinion that courts, first and last, sense these [moral]
factors, even though vaguely at times, and even though the thick
mists of their terminology are hard to penetrate.”41
Because under the realist theory all the heavy lifting in judicial reasoning is done by policy considerations, there is no argumentative work left for proximate causation to do. The only function of proximate causation claims is to divert attention away
from the true basis of the decision:
The phraseology of causation . . . has served but one useful
function, and that has been to give the judges a dependable
way out of difficult situations when they have made up their
minds but either do not know how, or else do not take the
time, to articulate their conclusions on a rational basis.42

37

See generally Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmund-

son eds., 2005).
38 See, e.g., Green, supra note 9, at 622–23.
39 Id. at 620–21.
40 Id. at 620.
41 Id. at 627.
42 Id. at 626.
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On the realist theory of judicial decision-making, then, judgments of proximate causation were not—indeed, could not be—
premises in legal argument; to the contrary, they had to be the
conclusions. Once the judge had decided to hold the defendant responsible, they would conclude that their action was the proximate cause of the harm.
The early legal realists were vague about the nature of the
policy judgments that judges applied in proximate cause cases.
Judge Edgerton, for example, described these assessments as
“our free and independent sense of justice and—perhaps—[ ] the
interests of society.”43 Later realists—most notably, the economic
analysts of law, such as Judges Guido Calabresi44 and Richard
Posner45 and Professor Steven Shavell46—were quite explicit. On
their view, the function of tort law is to maximize economic efficiency. Tort law imposes liability on wrongdoers so that people
internalize the social costs of their actions.47 According to these
realists, then, proximate cause judgments are simply judgments
about economically efficient behavior. X is the proximate cause of
activity Y just in cases in which deterring X from engaging in Y is
efficient.
The realist rejection of proximate causation as a separate
premise in legal reasoning and the gradual acceptance of realism
by lawyers can be traced through the Restatement of Torts. The
Second Restatement changed the name of proximate cause to “legal cause” in order to emphasize its normative, nonfactual nature.48 Proximate cause is not “out there” waiting to be discovered,
but a creation of the law designed to impute responsibility. The
Third Restatement went further by expressly advocating the
abandonment of the phrases “proximate cause” and “legal cause”
and the adoption of the phrase “scope of liability”; the ALI’s decision reflects its judgment that “proximate cause” is policy, not
cause.49
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Edgerton, supra note 31, at 347.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 240–41 (1970).
45 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 110 (1983).
46 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 675 (1994).
47 See id. at 678.
48 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
49 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010) (stating
that “the term ‘proximate cause’ is a poor one to describe limits on the scope of liability”
44
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Somewhat ironically, formalism about proximate causation
has the same explanatory roots. Like the realists, formalists believed that judges normally rule according to their sense of justice.
Formalists interpreted the doctrine of proximate causation differently, however, because they understood the requirements of justice differently. On their view, judges treat proximate causation
as a metaphysically real relation because people cannot be held
morally responsible for their actions unless their actions bear this
objective, descriptive relation to the harm that occurred. Consider
my poisoning of you because I am jealous of your success. I am
morally responsible for your death not only because I intended
your death and acted on that intention—I am responsible because
I caused your death. The moral relation between my act and your
death depends essentially on the objective factual relation between these two events. As Professor Michael Moore has written:
“What we feel, and rightly feel, is that when our culpability causes
serious injury to others, we are much more blameworthy than
when it does not. Causation matters morally in this way.”50
As we can see, realists and formalists start from the same
point but end up with very different theories. Realists deny that
proximate causation is a real relation because, on their view,
judges largely decide cases on the basis of moral considerations,
and morality does not care for arcane metaphysics. Judgments of
proximate causation, therefore, cannot be premises in judicial
reasoning but must rather be conclusions to the effect that the
defendant be held responsible for the harm factually caused. Formalists, on the other hand, consider proximate causation to be a
real, descriptive relation because judges largely decide cases on
moral considerations, and moral responsibility is essentially tied
to the metaphysics of causation, arcane though they may sometimes be. Judgments of proximate causation, therefore, cannot be
conclusions of judicial reasoning but rather have to be premises
that generate decisions about responsibility for harm.
II. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
Thus far, we have been discussing a debate between two different views of the relationship between causal judgments and

and recommending that factual cause be distinguished from “scope-of-liability” issues in
jury instructions).
50 MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS 33 (2009).
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moral judgments. On the formalist view, judges make judgments
of proximate cause without taking moral considerations into account, and they then use those judgments of proximate cause as
premises in a subsequent moral judgment:
Proximate Cause à Moral
This model captures the intuitive sense that judges are using
claims about proximate cause to figure out whether a defendant
should be held liable, but it leaves us with the somewhat strained
conclusion that judges have some way of assessing proximate causation that is entirely independent of morality.
By contrast, on the realist view, judges first make a moral
judgment and then use the notion of proximate causation in a
purely conclusory fashion to justify the judgment they have already made:
Moral à Proximate Cause
This latter model captures the idea that moral judgments can
sometimes influence assessments of proximate cause, but it then
saddles us with the claim that these assessments of proximate
cause play no role at all in judges’ attempts to determine whether
the defendant should be held liable.
A great deal has been written on the conflict between these
two views, and it might at first appear that they are the only two
positions worth taking seriously. After all, if we have two kinds of
judgments and we know that they stand in some kind of relation,
it seems that there are only so many possible ways in which this
relation could work.
We want to suggest, however, that a third possibility might
be worth examining:
Moral à Proximate Cause à Moral
This third model departs from both formalism and realism. The
model denies that judgments of proximate causation are made
purely on the basis of descriptive facts. It insists that judgments
of proximate causation are sometimes influenced by moral considerations (hence the departure from formalism). Yet, at the
same time, the model says that judgments of proximate causation
are not just some kind of post hoc window dressing. They truly do
play a role in the process leading up to moral judgment (hence the
departure from realism). In other words, the model says that
moral judgments can influence causal judgments but that these
causal judgments in turn influence moral judgments.
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To see how this answer might be possible, it will be necessary
to adopt a somewhat different way of framing the question. Our
discussion thus far has been based on the assumption that there
are two things—causal judgments and moral judgments—and
that the aim is to understand the relation between them. But this
way of framing the problem is actually deeply misleading. It is
not as though there really is just a single monolithic thing called
“moral judgment.” Faced with any given case, people will typically make numerous different moral judgments of quite different
kinds. They might judge that an act was morally wrong, that the
agent deserves blame, that the defendant should be liable. Of
course, all of these judgments are concerned in some way with
moral questions, but it would be wrong just to lump them all together in a single category. These judgments are fundamentally
different from one another, and they each need to be considered
separately.
With these distinctions in place, we can introduce a further
clarification to the proposed model. The model is best depicted as
follows:
Moral 1 à Cause à Moral 2
In other words, the suggestion is that moral judgments of one type
can influence causal judgments, but these causal judgments then
influence moral judgments of another type. The model therefore
involves no element of circularity. Though the judgment on the
left and the judgment on the right are both concerned with moral
questions, they are distinct judgments, which play quite distinct
roles in legal reasoning.51
Perhaps the best way to illustrate our approach is to return
to the example with which we began: the court’s decision in
51 Insofar as our model posits that moral judgments play a fundamental role in shaping
the causal judgments that ultimately lead to judgments of legal responsibility, it resists the
call made by some theorists, including Professors Jane Stapleton and Richard Wright, to
“clearly distinguish” empirical from normative factors in judgments of legal responsibility.
Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the
Extent of Legal Responsibility, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (2001). For example, Stapleton
has argued that “distilling normative principles from the ‘proximate cause’/‘scope’ case law
can be done and, in the interests of legal clarity, should be done.” Jane Stapleton, Choosing
What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433, 463 (2008). Similarly, Wright
has argued that “the phrases ‘proximate cause’ and ‘legal cause,’ and other phrases that confusingly merge the empirical issue of causal contribution with the normative issue of the
extent of legal responsibility . . . should be replaced with terminology that clearly distinguishes these two issues.” Wright, supra, at 1131. Our model, in contrast, suggests that the
interplay of normative and empirical factors is a fundamental aspect of ordinary causal judgments, rather than a “confusion” stemming from insufficiently clear legal terminology.
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Henningsen. Faced with that case, one might conclude that the
defendant was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (a causal judgment), and one might also conclude that the defendant acted
wrongly and should be held liable (moral judgments). What is the
relationship between these various judgments? Here the formalist and the realist give opposite answers. On the formalist view,
one first makes the causal judgment and then uses this causal
judgment as a premise in moral reasoning. On the realist view,
one first makes the moral judgment and then introduces a causal
judgment at the end just to offer some post hoc justification for
the moral judgment one has already made.
We suggest a view that steers a middle path between these
two extremes. On this proposal, people first make a judgment
about the defendant’s action that in some way involves morality.
Then, based in part on this first judgment, they conclude that the
defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Finally, based in part on this judgment of proximate cause, they
conclude that the defendant should be held liable. The key point
here is that although the first judgment in this sequence does
involve morality, it is not in any way a judgment about whether
the defendant should be held liable. It is some entirely different
kind of judgment.
Ultimately, the only way to know whether this new model is
correct is to look at actual legal decisions and legal doctrines, and
we pursue that approach in Parts IV and V. We will start off,
however, by looking to a more indirect source of evidence.
III. THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF CAUSAL AND MORAL JUDGMENT
Both formalists and realists emphasize that judges are people and that legal reasoning is shaped in important respects by
more general facts about the way people make sense of the
world.52 We completely agree with this general approach, and we
rely on it here. However, recent years have seen the development
of a new source of information about people’s ordinary understanding that simply was not available at the time of the original
debate between formalists and realists. We now have access to
the results of systematic experimental studies that examine the
way people ordinarily think about causation and morality, and

52 See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16
LEGAL THEORY 111, 112 (2010).
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these results have the potential to offer us important clues regarding questions about how these notions are used in the law.
A. Causal Structure and Causal Selection
As we noted above, discussions of causation in the law often
draw a distinction between questions of factual causation and
questions of proximate causation.53 Research on causal judgments
within cognitive science sometimes makes use of a roughly analogous distinction, which is there described as a distinction between
causal structure and causal selection.54
Questions of causal structure are questions about which
states and events depend on which other states and events.55
Thus, suppose that you are in a particularly good mood today.
Your good mood might depend on the fact that it is so sunny out.
(If it hadn’t been so sunny, you would not have been in a good
mood.) However, it should be obvious that your good mood also
depends on an enormous array of other conditions. For example,
it depends on the fact that you were born. (If you had never been
born, you would not now be in a good mood.) It also depends on
the fact that your grandparents met, the fact that there is oxygen
in the Earth’s atmosphere, the fact that you are not covered in
poisonous spiders, and the fact of the big bang. Research in cognitive science can examine the ways in which people come to understand this whole complex web of dependencies.56
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See supra text accompanying notes 24–26.
See Christopher Hitchcock, Three Concepts of Causation, 2 PHIL. COMPASS 508,
508–11 (2007). The notion of causal selection originated in the metaphysics literature
within philosophy, where it was often suggested that people’s ordinary causal intuitions
were selective in a way that metaphysical theories of causation should not be. See JOHN
STUART MILL, 1 A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE: BEING A CONNECTED
VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, AND METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 360–
61 (London, John W. Parker 1843); Lewis, supra note 30, at 558–59.
55 Causal structure has been explored extensively within the literature on graphical
causal models. See, e.g., JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE
12–20 (2d ed. 2009). In Part III.E., we spell out our own view using formal tools developed
within this literature, but for present purposes, very little hangs on any of these issues. If
existing research on causal structure turns out to be mistaken in certain respects, the
points we are making about the legal doctrine of proximate cause will remain more or less
unaffected.
56 For work within cognitive science on how people ordinarily infer causal structure,
see, for example, Thomas L. Griffiths & Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Structure and Strength in
Causal Induction, 51 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 334, 334–84 (2005). See also Alison Gopnik, Clark
Glymour, David M. Sobel, Laura E. Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks, A Theory of
Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets, 111 PSYCH. REV. 3, 7 (2004).
54
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It should be noted, however, that people do not usually describe all of these relationships of dependence as relationships of
causation. In the example under discussion here, people might
agree with the statement, “The good weather caused your good
mood,” but they would probably disagree with the statements,
“Your birth caused your good mood,” or, “Your good mood was
caused by the absence of poisonous spiders.” So people must have
some way of sifting through all of the factors picked out by the
causal structure and figuring out which of them count as genuine
causes. The question as to how people do this is known as the
problem of causal selection, and it too can be studied using the
methods of cognitive science.
Within the existing cognitive science literature, these judgments are normally understood not as dichotomous but as
graded.57 Thus, a person might think that your good mood was
mostly caused by the nice dinner you had but also partly caused
by the good weather. In an example like this one, both the dinner
and the weather are regarded as causes, but the dinner is seen as
causal to a greater degree than the weather is. Experimental
studies typically capture these graded judgments by having participants rate on a scale the degree to which a particular factor
caused the outcome.
Importantly, then, the judgments explored within the cognitive science literature do not map directly onto the judgments
made in the law. For example, in Henningsen, the legal question
was whether the gun dealer’s actions counted as a proximate
cause or whether the mother’s actions superseded them.58 Research in cognitive science does not directly address judgments
like this one. Instead, cognitive science research would give us
information about two things: the degree to which the gun
dealer’s actions were seen as a cause and the degree to which the
mother’s actions were seen as a cause. Ultimately, we will argue
that research in cognitive science on these two things can shed
light on legal judgments of proximate cause, but for the moment,
57 For an explicit defense of the claim that ordinary causal judgments are graded,
see Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock, Graded Causation and Defaults, 66 BRIT.
J. PHIL. SCI. 413, 433–36 (2015). More generally, even when there is no explicit emphasis
on the claim that causal judgment is graded, cognitive science research tends to measure
causal judgment on a scale and to use continuous judgments on that scale to predict other
variables. See, e.g., Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw, Manipulating Morality: Third-Party
Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning, 39 COGNITIVE SCI.
1320, 1329–31 (2015).
58 Henningsen, 230 N.Y.S. at 315.
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we will simply focus directly on the cognitive science research
itself.
B. Causal Selection and Moral Judgment
Existing research has yielded a variety of fascinating findings about the considerations that influence causal selection. Our
focus here, however, will be on just one of these considerations.
We will be exploring the ways in which causal selection is influenced by moral judgment.59
To get a rough sense for the contours of this effect, consider
the following simple vignette:
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her
desk stocked with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are supposed to
buy their own.
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist has
repeatedly emailed them reminders that only administrative
assistants are allowed to take the pens.
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith walking past the receptionist’s
desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs
to take an important message . . . but she has a problem.
There are no pens left on her desk.60
Note that the vignette has been constructed in such a way that
the action of the professor and the action of the administrative
assistant are almost exactly alike. Both take pens, both behave in
a way that is statistically typical, and both play the same role in
the causal structure. (If either action had not been performed, the
problem would not have arisen.) The only major difference between them is that the professor is described as doing something

59 Within the empirical literature in cognitive science, the impact of moral judgment
on causal judgment was first documented in Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 368, 376 (1992). Within the philosophical literature, this effect
has been discussed primarily in the context of causation by omission. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Causation: Omissions, 66 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RSCH. 81, 99 (2003); Sarah
McGrath, Causation by Omission: A Dilemma, 123 PHIL. STUD. 125, 132–48 (2005).
60 Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser, Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY: INTUITION AND
DIVERSITY 441, 443 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008).
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wrong, whereas the administrative assistant is described as doing
exactly what she was supposed to do.
Importantly, experimental participants do not see these two
agents as equally causal. Instead, participants tend to say that
Professor Smith caused the problem, but that the administrative
assistant did not cause the problem.61 This result suggests that
people’s causal selection judgments can be influenced by their
judgments as to whether an agent has done something wrong.
Subsequent studies have replicated and extended this finding
in numerous ways. There are studies that look at controversial
moral questions and show that people’s causal judgments in such
cases depend on their moral views.62 There are studies showing
an impact of morality in more complex causal structures, such as
those involving what philosophers call “causation by omissions.”63
There are studies that examine the impact of morality while more
closely controlling for considerations of statistical typicality.64
There are numerous studies demonstrating that these effects also
arise in other vignettes using quite different scenarios.65 At this
point, there can be little doubt that people’s moral judgments do
have some sort of impact on their causal judgments.
It is hard not to be struck by the parallel between this pattern
in people’s ordinary judgments and the pattern observed in the
law. In people’s ordinary judgments, we find that an action is
more likely to be regarded as a cause if it is seen as in some way
bad.66 Analogously, in the law, we saw that a defendant is more
likely to be regarded as a proximate cause if she is seen as culpable.67 Given this striking similarity between ordinary judgment
and the law, we propose to investigate the former as a way of
gaining insight into the latter.
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Id.
E.g., Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Appraisals Affect Doing/Allowing Judgments, 108 COGNITION 281, 282–83 (2008).
63 E.g., Pascale Willemsen, Omissions and Expectations: A New Approach to the
Things We Failed to Do, 195 SYNTHESE 1587, 1592–95 (2018).
64 E.g., Craig Roxborough & Jill Cumby, Folk Psychological Concepts: Causation, 22
PHIL. PSYCH. 205, 209–10 (2009).
65 E.g., Jana Samland, Marina Josephs, Michael R. Waldmann & Hannes Rakoczy,
The Role of Prescriptive Norms and Knowledge in Children’s and Adults’ Causal Selection,
145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 125, 127–28 (2016); Jason Shepard & Phillip Wolff, Intentionality, Evaluative Judgments, and Causal Structure, 35 PROC. 35TH ANN. CONF.
COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 3390, 3392–93 (2013).
66 Knobe & Fraser, supra note 60, at 443.
67 See supra text accompanying notes 33–42.
62
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So then, how exactly are we to understand the impact of
moral judgment on people’s ordinary, causal-selection judgments? One possible way to answer this question would be to introduce a hypothesis that is closely analogous to the realist view
about proximate cause in the law. Within ordinary judgments,
there is clearly a close link between causal judgment and blame
judgment. Ordinarily, we might assume that this connection goes
in one specific direction: the causal judgment comes first, and the
blame judgment is a downstream consequence. One might now
suggest that the relationship between these two judgments is
sometimes reversed. On this hypothesis, the impact of moral
judgment has a very simple explanation. People want to conclude
that the agent deserves blame, and they therefore conclude that
the agent caused the outcome.68
We argue against this simple hypothesis. To begin with, we
need to introduce a few additional concepts. Armed with these
concepts, we can then formulate a new hypothesis and ask
whether that hypothesis does a better job of accounting for the
existing empirical data.
C. Introducing Normality
The first concept we need is the concept of a norm. People see
some events as conforming to norms, and others as violating
norms. To get clear about what this means, it will be helpful to
distinguish two different kinds of norms and to explore their relationship in people’s ordinary cognition.69
On one hand, there are what we might call statistical norms.
These are simply facts about which things are frequent and which
are infrequent.70 For example, it is a statistical fact that summers
in New York tend to be hot. Thus, we might say that the norm in
68 Regardless of whether this process explains the phenomena under discussion here,
there is very strong evidence in the existing empirical literature that such a process does
sometimes take place and does explain certain important phenomena. Mark D. Alicke,
Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556, 558 (2000).
69 For a classic discussion of different types of norms, see Robert B. Cialdini, Carl A.
Kallgren & Raymond R. Reno, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES EXP. SOC.
PSYCH. 201, 202–23 (1991). For more recent influential treatments, see CRISTINA BICCHIERI,
THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 8–34 (2005);
Chandra S. Sripada & Stephen Stich, A Framework for the Psychology of Norms, in 2 THE
INNATE MIND: CULTURE AND COGNITION 281–301 (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 2007).
70 See Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood & David Rose, Two Types of Typicality:
Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions, 43 STUD.
HIST. & PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 814, 815–16 (2012).
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New York is for summers to be hot, and if the weather one summer in New York happened to be cold, we feel that we were witnessing the violation of a statistical norm.
On the other hand, there are what we might call prescriptive
norms. To determine whether an agent violated a prescriptive
norm, one would have to go beyond just making straightforward
statistical judgments and actually make a value judgment about
whether the agent did anything wrong.71 For example, suppose
that students consistently hand in their papers too late. Then a
student who handed in her paper at the usual (late) time would
not be violating a statistical norm. Still, we might judge that it
was wrong of her to hand in the paper so late, and we might therefore regard her as having violated a prescriptive norm.
At least at first, one might assume that people have separate
representations for these separate norms. That is, one might assume that people have a representation of the statistical norms
and then, completely separately, a representation of the prescriptive norms. Though this approach might seem plausible in the abstract, research in cognitive science suggests that it is not the way
people’s minds actually work. Instead, people seem to integrate
these two kinds of norms into undifferentiated representation of
what is normal.72
As one example, consider norms about how much television
to watch. When participants are asked to make a purely statistical judgment about how much TV the average person watches,
they tend to guess a relatively high number. By contrast, when
they are asked to make a purely prescriptive judgment about the
ideal amount of TV to watch, they tend to pick a relatively low
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Id. at 815.
See Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe, Normality: Part Descriptive, Part Prescriptive,
167 COGNITION 25, 35 (2017) (reporting a series of studies that indicate that statistical
and prescriptive norms are integrated into a single undifferentiated notion of the normal);
Adam Bear, Samantha Bensinger, Julian Jara-Ettinger, Joshua Knobe & Fiery Cushman,
What Comes to Mind?, 194 COGNITION 104057, at 6 (2020) (showing that the probability
of something coming to mind is a function of both statistical and prescriptive norms); Jonathan Phillips & Fiery Cushman, Morality Constrains the Default Representation of What
Is Possible, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4649, 4650 (2017) (showing that the use of natural
language modals is shaped by both statistical and prescriptive norms); Tomasz Wysocki,
Normality: A Two-Faced Concept, REV. PHIL. PSYCH., at 18–20 (Mar. 14, 2020) (showing
that use of the English word “normal” reflects a blend of statistical and prescriptive
norms); Steven O. Roberts, Arnold K. Ho & Susan A. Gelman, The Role of Group Norms
in Evaluating Uncommon and Negative Behaviors, 148 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 374, 384
(2019) (showing that children blend judgments about what is statistically infrequent into
their judgments about what is prescriptively wrong).
72
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number.73 But now consider the case in which participants are
simply asked to state “a normal amount of TV to watch in a day.”74
In that case, they tend to pick a number that is intermediate between the statistical average and the prescriptive ideal.75 A similar pattern emerges when participants are asked about the normal number of hours to exercise in a week, the normal number of
lies to tell in a week, and the normal percentage of students who
will cheat on an exam.76 In each of these domains, people seem to
be integrating statistical and prescriptive considerations into a
single undifferentiated notion of normality.
This framework allows us to introduce another kind of judgment people can make about actions. In addition to anything else
people might think about an action, people can judge that the action is abnormal.77 In making this kind of judgment, they are not
concluding that the agent is to blame for any further outcome that
may ensue. Rather, they are making a judgment that is in some
ways prior to, or more basic than, a judgment of blame. All they
are concluding is that the action itself violated a norm.
Importantly, people will see an action as abnormal to the extent that it violates any kind of norm. Some actions will be seen
as abnormal because they violate statistical norms. Others will
be seen as abnormal because they violate prescriptive norms that
have nothing to do with morality (as in the case of people who
watch too much TV). Still others will be seen as abnormal because
they violate prescriptive norms that are specifically moral.78
Thus, moral considerations play a role in judgments of abnormality, but various other considerations play precisely the same role.
With all this in the background, we can now introduce our
key claim about people’s ordinary causal judgments. Existing
studies show that people’s causal judgments can be impacted in
some way by their moral judgments. We argue that this effect
does not arise because people’s causal judgments are impacted by
their beliefs about whether an agent is to blame for the outcome.
Rather, it arises because people’s causal judgments are impacted
by their beliefs about whether the agent’s behavior is abnormal.
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See Bear & Knobe, supra note 72, at 29.
Id. at 26.
75 See id. at 28–29. For further studies showing this pattern of judgment, see
Wysocki, supra note 72, at 26.
76 Bear & Knobe, supra note 72, at 28 tbl.1.
77 Id. at 26.
78 Id. at 26, 33; see also Wysocki, supra note 72, at 8, 24–26.
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D. Patterns of Causal Judgment
The evidence for this hypothesis comes in large part from
facts about the precise patterns observed in people’s causal selection judgments. We therefore turn in this Section to the details of
some of those patterns.
Before describing these patterns, it will be helpful to introduce some simple terminology. Consider a legal case in which one
wants to know whether the defendant is the proximate cause of
an outcome. One’s judgment in such a case might depend in part
on properties of the defendant’s conduct itself and in part on properties of various alternative causal factors that may or may not
supersede. Analogously, within the cognitive science literature,
experimental studies have explored the ways in which people’s
causal judgments about a given causal factor depend on properties of that factor itself and also on properties of various alternative factors. We will consistently use the letter C for the causal
factor about which experimental participants are actually asked.
Then we will use the letter A for any other alternative causal factors that might appear in the case.
We can now define what we will call a “conjunctive case.”
A case is conjunctive if there exists a causal factor C and
some alternative causal factor A, such that the outcome will
occur if both of these factors are present and will not occur if
either is absent.79
The case of the professor and the pens80 is a paradigm example of
a conjunctive case. In it, we have two different factors—the professor taking a pen and the administrative assistant taking a
pen—such that if either of these factors had been absent, the outcome would not have occurred.
As we have seen, there is a general tendency in these cases
for people’s causal judgments to be impacted by their moral judgments. Specifically, factor C will be regarded as more causal to
the degree that it is seen as morally wrong.81 The normality-based
approach now makes an important new prediction. If this effect
is indeed driven by a judgment about the degree to which an event
is normal or abnormal, we should be able to obtain precisely this
same effect for violations of purely statistical norms.
79 See Thomas F. Icard, Jonathan F. Kominsky & Joshua Knobe, Normality and Actual Causal Strength, 161 COGNITION 80, 82 (2017).
80 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 59–65.
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Importantly, existing studies suggest that this prediction is
indeed borne out.82 In fact, this is the phenomenon at work in the
example we first used to illustrate the concept of causal selection.
Suppose that you are in a good mood and that you would not have
been in such a good mood if either (a) it had not been so sunny out
or (b) there had been no oxygen in the atmosphere. In such a case,
it seems intuitive that your good mood was caused by the sunny
day but not by the oxygen in the atmosphere. Why is that? The
answer appears to come down to statistical considerations. It is
more statistically infrequent for there to be a sunny day than for
there to be oxygen in the atmosphere.
In short, in conjunctive cases, people tend to regard a factor
as especially causal both when it is morally wrong and when it is
statistically infrequent.83 The normality-based account provides a
unified explanation of these two effects.84 By contrast, the blamebased account would have to say that the two effects arise for two
unrelated reasons (one because of moral blame, the other because
of some purely statistical kind of cognition). This is certainly a
possible view, but we have at least some reason to prefer the account that provides a unified explanation.
Let’s now turn to a second effect. In this second effect, people
actually attribute less causation to C when they regard the alternative causal factor A as abnormal rather than normal. Studies
consistently find this effect for moral judgments.85 Thus, if people
judge that the professor was wrong to take a pen, they do not
merely regard the professor’s actions as more causal; they also
regard the administrative assistant’s actions as less causal.
An obvious initial hypothesis would be that this effect is
driven by judgments of blame. When people see factor A as morally wrong, they may be disinclined to blame factor C, and this
may make them reluctant to describe factor C as a cause of the
outcome. Yet, though this hypothesis might initially seem plausible,
we argue that it is actually incorrect. On our view, the effect is
driven not by judgments about whether factor C is blameworthy,
but rather by judgments about whether factor A is abnormal. Thus,

82 See Denis J. Hilton & Ben R. Slugoski, Knowledge-Based Causal Attribution: The
Abnormal Conditions Focus Model, 93 PSYCH. REV. 75, 82–87 (1986).
83 See Bear & Knobe, supra note 72, at 33; see also Knobe & Fraser, supra note 60,
at 443; Hilton & Slugoski, supra note 82, at 82–87.
84 See Bear & Knobe, supra note 72, at 35.
85 See, e.g., Icard et al., supra note 79, at 81–82.
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we predict that the effect should persist even in cases where the
question about whether factor C is blameworthy clearly plays no role.
Existing research provides two pieces of evidence for this claim.
First, studies also show a completely parallel effect for purely statistical judgments.86 In other words, when A is seen as highly infrequent or improbable, people not only regard A as more causal;
they also regard C as less causal.87 In such cases, factor A is regarded as abnormal, but the question of blame simply does not
arise. Still, we continue to find the same effect on causal judgments.
Second, the effect continues to emerge even when the outcome is not itself bad. In other words, it is true that when factor A
is seen as morally wrong, factor C is seen as less of a cause of bad
outcomes that ensue, but this effect is actually quite general. Factor C also ends up being seen as less of a cause of outcomes that
are perfectly innocuous.
As an example, consider the following vignette:
Bill’s wife, Sue, is out of town for the weekend. She leaves
Bill a message that says, “I just saw this marvelous bookend.
It’s called a Bartlett bookend. So pretty! I’m going to go back
tomorrow and get one. It will be perfect for the left side of our
bookshelf.”
Bill goes and visits his friend. Bill and his friend talk for a
while, and when Bill asks if his friend is willing to sell the
bookend, his friend tells him it’s a precious heirloom and he
can’t part with it. Bill waits until later when his friend is in
the bathroom, and slips the bookend into his bag. Finally, Bill
leaves his friend’s house with the stolen right-side Bartlett
bookend in his bag.
Then the next day, Sue goes and buys the left-side Bartlett
bookend. So, when Sue got home, they had the paired set of
bookends.88
Now ask yourself whether you agree with following statement:
Sue caused them to possess the paired set of bookends.
Note that the statement here says that Sue is the cause of a completely innocuous outcome. Thus, if you disagree with this
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See Icard et al., supra note 79, at 81–82.
Id. at 81.
88 Jonathan F. Kominsky, Jonathan Phillips, Tobias Gerstenberg, David Lagnado &
Joshua Knobe, Causal Superseding, 137 COGNITION 196, 200 tbl.1 (2015).
87
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statement, you are not thereby suggesting anything at all about
the degree to which Sue is deserving of blame. Yet studies show
that the supersession effect arises even here. Experimental participants see Sue as less causal when Bill steals the other bookend
than when he buys it legally.89
Third, the effect depends in a crucial way on the causal structure of the case at hand. We have been focusing thus far on cases
with conjunctive structures, but suppose we turn now to “disjunctive cases.”90 We can define this type of case as follows:
A case is disjunctive if there exists a causal factor C and some
alternative causal factor A, such that the outcome will occur if
either factor is present but will not occur if both are absent.91
In disjunctive cases, the effect completely disappears. When
the alternative causal factor A is seen as morally wrong, people
show no tendency at all to say that factor C is less causal.92 Thus,
the effect observed here does not seem to be just a matter of wanting to let the agent off the hook when some other factor is to
blame. It seems to be revealing something far more fundamental
about how people make causal judgments.
E. A Formal Model
Within cognitive science research on these topics, one common approach is to develop formal mathematical models that predict and explain the patterns in people’s judgments.93 We discuss
89

See id. at 200–01.
Cases of this type have long played a key role in work on causal judgment, in
part because they provide a counterexample to the simple view on which outcomes must
always be counterfactually dependent on their causes (i.e., on which it must be the case
that if the cause had not occurred, the outcome would not have occurred). Within the
philosophical literature, there have been a number of different attempts to address this
issue. See, e.g., David Lewis, Causation as Influence, 97 J. PHIL. 182, 182 (2000); Joseph
Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl, Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach.
Part I: Causes, 56 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 843, 852–58 (2005); Jonathan Schaffer, Trumping
Preemption, 97 J. PHIL. 165, 176–81 (2000). For a discussion in the context of causation
in the law, see Macleod, supra note 17, at 1009–10.
91 See Icard et al., supra note 79, at 82.
92 Id.
93 For existing research that aims to provide formal models of causal strength, see
Patricia W. Cheng, From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory, 104 PSYCH.
REV. 367, 377 (1997); Barbara A. Spellman, Crediting Causality, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCH. GEN. 323, 327 (1997); Branden Fitelson & Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic
Measures of Causal Strength, in CAUSALITY IN THE SCIENCES 600, 604–05 (Phyllis M. Illari
et al. eds., 2011). The effects reviewed in the previous Sections were discovered after the
publication of these models, and none of them predict these specific effects. However, the
model we will be presenting below is very much in the tradition of the earlier models.
90
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one such model here, but before we get into the details, it may be
helpful to say a quick word about the role of these models in ongoing research.
Thus far, we have been talking in a very straightforward way
about the patterns observed in people’s causal judgments. Over
the past few years, a variety of further studies have provided further evidence for these patterns, and there is a growing consensus
within the literature that these patterns really do exist.94 By contrast, there is relatively little consensus about how to explain on
a deeper level why these patterns are emerging. We will be considering a specific formal model—and we do think that this model
provides some valuable insight—but these are difficult questions,
and different researchers might well have different opinions
about them.95
With that said, let’s consider a formal model, originally developed by Professor Thomas Icard and colleagues, that

94 See, e.g., Tobias Gerstenberg & Thomas Icard, Expectations Affect Physical Causation Judgments, 149 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. GEN. 599, 602–04 (2020) (showing that
these effects arise even when participants are not given verbal vignettes but instead see
the events occurring in a video display); Lara Kirfel, Thomas Icard & Tobias Gerstenberg,
Inference from Explanation 10–17 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (illustrating that
when people hear an explanation, they can correctly make inferences about whether the
causal structure was conjunctive or disjunctive and about the normality of each factor);
Paul Henne, Kevin O’Neill, Paul Bello, Sangeet Khemlani & Felipe De Brigard, Norms
Affect Prospective Causal Judgments 26 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (demonstrating
that abnormal inflation arises even for judgments about events that have not yet occurred); Paul Henne, Laura Niemi, Ángel Pinillos, Felipe De Brigard & Joshua Knobe, A
Counterfactual Explanation for the Action Effect in Causal Judgment, 190 COGNITION 157,
157–64 (2019) (showing that omissions are regarded as less causal than actions in conjunctive cases but more causal than actions in disjunctive cases). For a review of recent
empirical work on this topic, see generally Pascale Willemsen & Lara Kirfel, Recent Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Causal Judgments and Norms, 14 PHIL.
COMPASS e12562 (2019).
95 Recent work has led to the development of a number of attempts to explain the
effects we have been discussing that do not involve formal mathematical models of causal
strength of the type we will be discussing here. See, e.g., Justin Sytsma, Causation, Responsibility, and Typicality, REV. PHIL. & PSYCH. 1, 22–30 (forthcoming) (arguing that the
impact of statistical norms on causal judgment is itself best understood in terms of responsibility attribution); Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann, How Prescriptive Norms Influence Causal Inferences, 156 COGNITION 164, 164–66 (2016) (arguing that the impact of
prescriptive norms on causal judgment arises from a distinct process from the one driving
the impact of statistical norms); Mark D. Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom, Causation,
Norm Violation, and Culpable Control, 108 J. PHIL. 670 , 689–93 (2011) (arguing that the
impact of prescriptive norms is actually due to motivated reasoning and a desire to blame);
Lara Kirfel & David Lagnado, I Know What You Did Last Summer (and How Often). Epistemic States and Statistical Normality in Causal Judgments, 2019 COGSCI 575, 580 (arguing that the effect arises because of people’s inferences about the beliefs about the
agents within the vignettes).
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successfully predicts all of the findings we have discussed thus
far.96 The first key idea is that the probability of considering a
possibility is proportional to its normality.97 When people are
thinking about ways things might be, they have a high probability
of considering possibilities in which things are normal and a lower
probability of considering possibilities in which things are abnormal.98 The assumption is that this tendency holds quite generally,
but the most important implication for present purposes is in
cases in which people are concerned with causal questions. Consider a case in which people are wondering whether some event C
caused an outcome. As they are thinking about this issue, people
might consider possibilities in which C did not occur (departing
in this way from the actual world) or possibilities in which C did
occur (just as it did in the actual world). The hypothesis is that
people will be more inclined to consider possibilities of the former
type when event C is abnormal, while being more inclined to consider possibilities of the latter type when the event C is normal.99
The second key idea is that when people are engaged in
causal judgment, they engage in different cognitive processes depending on which of these two possibilities they consider.100 When
people consider possibilities in which C did not occur, they ask
whether C is necessary for the outcome. That is, they ask whether
if C had not occurred, the outcome would not have occurred.101 By
contrast, when people consider possibilities in which C did occur,
they ask whether C is sufficient for the outcome. That is, they ask
whether, given that C occurred, the outcome would have occurred
even if various other things in the situation had been a little bit
different.102
96

See generally Icard et al., supra note 79.
See id. at 85.
98 See id. Although we focus on the implications of this claim for causal judgments in
particular, existing empirical research indicates that it applies far more broadly. See generally Bear et al., supra note 72, at 3; Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory:
Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCH. REV. 136 (1986).
99 Icard et al., supra note 79, at 85.
100 Id. at 86.
101 The idea that causal judgments are influenced in part by judgments of necessity,
understood at least broadly along these lines, has played an enormous role within in the
existing literature on causation and causal reasoning. The locus classicus for the idea is
Lewis, supra note 30, at 556–67. There have been numerous attempts to work out in detail
the relationship between causal judgment and necessity. See, e.g., Halpern & Pearl, supra
note 90, at 846.
102 Icard et al., supra note 79, at 84. This notion of sufficiency is derived in large part
from James Woodward, Sensitive and Insensitive Causation, 115 PHIL. REV. 1, 24–30 (2006).
Existing empirical research provides evidence that people’s causal intuitions are indeed
97

2021]

Proximate Cause Explained

195

The third key idea follows almost immediately from the first
two. Consider conjunctive cases in which the outcome will only
occur if events C and A both occur. Now consider what happens
in such a case when people are trying to determine whether C is
sufficient for the outcome. People will regard C as sufficient to the
extent that they consider cases in which A occurs and as insufficient to the extent that they consider cases in which A does not
occur. But the probability of considering cases in which A occurs
is itself proportional to the normality of A. Thus, the more A is
abnormal, the less people will regard C as sufficient for the
outcome.103
Putting all of these points together, we arrive at a specific
model of people’s causal judgments. On this model, the degree to
which people regard some event C as the cause of an outcome
should be a weighted sum of the degree to which C is necessary
for the outcome and the degree to which C is sufficient for the
outcome, with the weighting determined by the normality of C.104
Moreover, in conjunctive cases in which an outcome will occur
only when both C and A occur, the degree to which C is regarded
as sufficient for the outcome should be lower to the extent that A
is abnormal.
It can easily be shown that this causal strength measure predicts all three of the findings we have been discussing thus far.
That is, this measure predicts that: (a) in conjunctive cases, C
should be regarded as more causal when it is abnormal; (b) in conjunctive cases, C should be regarded as less causal when the alternative causal factor A is more abnormal; and (c) in disjunctive
cases, C should not be regarded as less causal when an alternative
causal factor A is more abnormal.105
We hasten to emphasize that this formal model is unlikely to
be correct in all its details and will almost certainly require
influenced by the degree to which a cause is seen as sufficient for its effect. See, e.g., Tania
Lombrozo, Causal-Explanatory Pluralism: How Intentions, Functions, and Mechanisms Influence Causal Ascriptions, 61 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 303, 308 (2010); Christopher Hitchcock,
Portable Causal Dependence: A Tale of Consilience, 79 PHIL. SCI. 942, 942–51 (2012).
103 See Icard et al., supra note 79, at 86–89.
104 Formalizing this, we can write P(C = 0) for the probability of considering possibilities in which C does not occur and P(C = 1) for the probability of considering possibilities in
which C does occur. We then write PνC = 0(O = 0) for the probability of taking C to be necessary for the outcome each time one considers the question and PσC = 1(O = 1) for the probability of taking C to be sufficient for the outcome each time one considers the question. The
causal strength measure can now be written P(C = 0)*PνC = 0(O = 0) + P(C = 1)*PσC = 1(O = 1).
See Icard et al., supra note 79, at 86.
105 See Icard et al., supra note 79, at 81–82.
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serious revision as additional empirical results come in. Still, as
we will see in a moment, this model has led to progress in the
study of these phenomena that bears directly on the question we
face here.
F.

Normality and Disjunction

Although the model was originally developed to predict and
explain three patterns that had already been observed in prior
research, it also predicts a new finding that had not yet been observed. Specifically, the model predicts an effect of normality in
disjunctive cases that actually goes in exactly the opposite direction of the one found in conjunctive cases.
In conjunctive cases, studies consistently show that abnormal
factors are regarded as especially causal.106 However, it can be
shown that the formal model predicts an effect in the opposite direction for disjunctive cases. In other words, in disjunctive cases,
the model predicts that the abnormal factors should be regarded
as less causal.
Studies have shown precisely that. For example, one study
used the following example:
Suzy and Billy are working on a project that is very important for our nation’s security. The boss tells Suzy: “Be sure
that you are here at exactly 9 a.m. It is absolutely essential
that you arrive at that time.” Then he tells Billy: “Be sure
that you do not come in at all tomorrow morning. It is absolutely essential that you do not appear at that time.”
Both Billy and Suzy arrive at 9 a.m.
As it happens, there was a motion detector installed in the
room where they arrived. The motion detector was set up to
be triggered if at least one person appeared in the room. So
the motion detector went off.107
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either this
version of the case or a version in which Billy’s action of arriving
at 9 a.m. was completely in accordance with the rules. Strikingly,
Billy was actually regarded as less causal when he violated the
norm than when he conformed to the norm.108
106

See id.
See id. at 87 tbl.3 (emphasis in original).
108 See id. at 87. In the time since that result was published, the effect has also been
observed in a number of further studies. E.g., Gerstenberg & Icard, supra note 94, at 600;
107
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It is hard to see how one could even begin to explain this result on the blame-based account. Why would our interest in blaming agents for their wrongdoing lead us in disjunctive cases to regard those agents who do wrong as less causal? By contrast, the
result is exactly what would be predicted by the formal implementation of the normality-based account. Thus, this result provides
even more reason to adopt the normality-based account rather
than the blame-based account.
G. Summary and Implications for Proximate Cause
In this Part, we looked in detail at the patterns in people’s
ordinary causal judgments. On one hand, we find that moral considerations play a role in these judgments, but on the other, we
find that this role is not best understood in terms of justifying
blame or punishment. These findings open up a new possibility in
our understanding of proximate cause judgments in the law. It is
at least possible that moral considerations play a role in these
judgments and that this role is explained by the role of moral considerations in people’s ordinary concept of causation.
To assess this possibility, we will need to look more closely at
the precise role of moral considerations in legal judgments of
proximate cause and ask whether the patterns observed in these
judgments correspond to the patterns observed in people’s ordinary causal judgments. But first, we should note an obvious difficulty. The model we have presented cannot be mapped in any
straightforward way onto legal judgments. It presents ordinary
causal judgments as graded judgments about the degree to which
an outcome was caused by the agent and the degree to which it
was caused by the alternative factor. But legal judgments of proximate cause are not graded, but dichotomous: either an event is
the proximate cause of harm or it isn’t. There is no in-between.109
To address this difficulty, we need to introduce some terminology that makes it easier to explore the relevance of ordinary
judgments for legal questions. The goal is to capture the intuition
that facts about the normality of the agent’s action and of the
Henne et al., supra note 94, at 160–61 (showing that omissions are regarded as more
causal than actions in disjunctive cases); Justin Sytsma, The Effects of Single Versus Joint
Evaluations on Causal Attributions 25 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (showing that the
effect does arise, but can be found only when participants are not asked about both potential causes).
109 Dichotomous does not imply exclusivity. Two events can both be proximate causes
of the same result.
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alternative causal factor can make the case that the alternative
causal factor “beats out” the agent, rendering the agent no longer
causal in the way she otherwise would have been. We will say in
such cases that the alternative causal factor “supersedes” the
agent.110
We can characterize the ordinary notion of cause in a dichotomous fashion by using the concept of supersession. Roughly
speaking, we can say that event E is the ordinary cause of harm H
if E supersedes all other alternative causal factors. Since supersession is a dichotomous notion, this notion of cause is dichotomous as well.
Because supersession will play a key role in our attempt to
bridge ordinary causal judgments with legal judgments, we
should be more precise about it. In particular, we need to distinguish between two ways of defining supersession. One approach
is essentially comparative. We might say that the alternative supersedes the agent when facts about the normality or abnormality
of the alternative make it the case that it is regarded as more
causal than the agent. We refer to this as “weak supersession,”
and it can be defined as follows:
The alternative weakly supersedes the agent if and only if
the alternative is regarded as more causal than the agent,
but the alternative would not have been regarded as more
causal than the agent if the alternative had been judged to
be exactly as normal as the agent’s action.
A second approach involves something that is not merely
comparative. We might say that the alternative supersedes the
agent, when facts about the normality or abnormality of the alternative make it the case that the agent is herself regarded as
less causal than she otherwise would have been. We refer to this
as “strong supersession,” and it can be defined as follows:
The alternative strongly supersedes the agent if and only if
the alternative weakly supersedes the agent, and the agent
is regarded as less causal than it would have been if the alternative had been judged to be exactly as normal as the
agent’s action.
The formal model presented above makes specific predictions
about when each of these criteria will be satisfied. We now consider these specific predictions. In conjunctive cases, the model
110

See generally Kominsky et al., supra note 89.
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predicts that any time the alternative weakly supersedes, it also
strongly supersedes. In other words, at a conceptual level, we can
draw a distinction between a criterion based on weak supersession and a criterion based on strong supersession, but at an empirical level, the model says that this distinction will never make
any difference in conjunctive cases. In all conjunctive cases, we
should arrive at the same conclusion regardless of which criterion
we use.
Moreover, the model makes a very simple prediction about
when the alternative supersedes. In conjunctive cases, the model
says that the alternative cause should (both weakly and strongly)
supersede if and only if the alternative is more abnormal than the
agent’s action.
In conjunctive cases, then, we can define a dichotomous notion of cause either in terms of weak or strong supersession. For
all events E in causal structure S leading to harm H, E is the
cause of H if E weakly or strongly supersedes all alternative
causal factors in S.
A similar strategy for disjunctive cases, however, is more
complicated. In disjunctive cases, the model predicts that an alternative causal factor might weakly supersede without strongly
superseding. More specifically, the alternative should never
strongly supersede, but it should weakly supersede whenever the
alternative is more normal than the agent’s action.
Since weak and strong supersession come apart in disjunctive
cases, we have two ways of defining a dichotomous notion of cause
in these situations. We might say that in disjunctive cases,
event E is the cause of harm H if E weakly supersedes all alternative factors in causal structure S. Or we can say that E is the
cause of H if E strongly supersedes all alternative factors.
The right formula for a dichotomous notion of cause in disjunctive cases depends on which notion of supersession is closer
to our ordinary notion of cause. We will not take a stand on this
issue, however. For as we see in Part VI, both notions of supersession are at play in the case law.
IV. REALISM AND FORMALISM REVISITED
The question how to understand proximate causation is a legal question (i.e., a question about how to understand a type of
judgment that is made by judges or juries in the context of distinctively legal proceedings). Still, it has long been recognized
that we can gain some insight into this legal question by looking
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at the kinds of judgments people make in more ordinary, nonlegal
contexts. Within the traditional debate, this core methodological
approach was common ground between the formalists and realists. Formalists argued that even outside of any legal context, people have an ordinary concept of causation that is in some way independent of morality.111 They then suggested that this very same
concept plays a key role in legal decision-making. By contrast, realists argued that even outside of any legal context, people generally try to ensure that agents are only blamed or punished for an
outcome when blame or punishment would be just or appropriate.112 They then suggested that this very same tendency drives
legal judgments of proximate cause: judges try to ascribe proximate cause in such a way that the defendant is only held liable
for an outcome when doing so would be just or appropriate.
As we have seen, research in cognitive science has provided
us with important new data about people’s ordinary causal judgment that was not available at the time of the traditional debate
about proximate causation.113 People’s ordinary causal judgments
do not appear to be independent of moral considerations. Instead,
moral considerations appear to play an important role in the way
people determine whether an agent’s action counts as the cause
of an outcome. However, the moral judgment that plays this role
does not appear to be a judgment about whether a given agent
should be blamed for the outcome. It appears instead to be a judgment about the degree to which the agent violated certain norms.
Thus, in cases in which people think that the agent did violate
norms but should not be blamed for the outcome, people’s causal
judgments will tend to come apart from their judgments about
whether the agent should be blamed. More strikingly, the impact
of norm violation shows various surprising patterns (e.g., in disjunctive cases) that are quite different from the patterns observed
for blame judgments.114
In light of these findings, it may be helpful to revisit the realist and formalist approaches to proximate causation. Each of
these approaches predicts that legal judgments of proximate
cause should depart in certain ways from the patterns cognitive
science research has observed for people’s ordinary judgments of
causation. We focus now on specific types of situations. For each
111
112
113
114

See supra text accompanying note 50.
See supra text accompanying notes 36–38.
See supra Part III.A–B.
See supra text accompanying notes 90–92.
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such situation, our question will be whether the predictions generated by realism and formalism fit the actual patterns of the
courts’ decisions.
A. Legal Realism
According to received wisdom, legal realism has an easy time
explaining the proximate causation case law. Judges attribute
proximate causation in accordance with their moral judgments
because, on the realist construal, judgments of proximate causation are moral judgments. To judge that X’s action proximately
caused Y’s harm is simply to judge that X is responsible for Y’s
harm.
The evidence we have been reviewing thus far does not bear
directly on claims about legal judgments of proximate cause, but
it does suggest that ordinary causal judgments do not work in this
way. The moral judgment that influences a person’s ordinary
causal judgment does not appear to be a moral judgment about
whether the agent should be held responsible for the outcome.
Rather, it appears to be a judgment about whether the agent’s
action itself violated a norm. This point comes out especially
clearly in the Bartlett bookends study.115 In that study, participants received either a case in which the agent violated a norm
or case in which the agent did not violate a norm. Either way,
however, the outcome was something completely innocuous (having a paired set of bookends). If we focus on judgments about
whether an agent is morally responsible for the outcome, one
might therefore expect to find no effect at all of norm violation.
Whether a theft was committed may affect whether the thief
bears responsible for returning it, but not whether he is liable for
the couple having a paired set of bookends. After all, no one is
liable for the couple having a paired set of bookends. Because liability does not arise, one might predict that causal attributions
would not be affected by whether a wrong has been committed.
But that is not the actual result. Instead, norm violations seem to
impact attributions of causation for all outcomes, even outcomes
that are not themselves bad.
These findings turn the traditional dialectic on its head. It
was usually assumed that legal realists needed to show that
judges behave like ordinary people. The assumption was that ordinary people would be guided by a desire to justify blame or by
115

See supra text accompanying note 88.
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policy concerns, rather than by some complex criteria for causation. Legal realists then aimed to show that judges are, at least
in this respect, like ordinary people. In light of recent empirical
findings, however, it seems that we should adopt the opposite perspective. Existing empirical findings suggest that people’s ordinary causal judgments are not simply guided by a desire to justify
blame or by policy concerns, but instead are governed by quite
complex criteria (e.g., reflecting judgments of norm violation judgment, not showing supersession in cases of overdetermination).116
For legal realists to vindicate their traditional position, they
would have to show that legal judgments of proximate cause actually depart from ordinary judgments in these respects.
Of course, examples like the Bartlett Bookends study will
never actually reach the courts. If the outcome is not regarded as
bad, there is no legal significance to the question of whether a
given agent was the cause of it. We will, therefore, never know
how judges would determine which agent is the proximate cause
in such a case. However, we can determine whether legal judgments depart from ordinary causal judgments by looking at cases
of two other types.
First, we can look at cases in which the outcome is bad but
there are strong policy reasons not to hold the defendant liable.
Consider cases of intrafamily tort immunity. In many states,
members of an immediate family cannot recover against each
other for negligence.117 A husband who drives drunk, for example,
and negligently runs over his wife is immune from tort liability.
On the theory we have been developing here, this immunity
should have no impact on judgments of proximate cause. The husband might not be liable, but he will still be judged to have violated a norm, and that is the only normative judgment relevant
here. By contrast, on the realist interpretation, the relevant normative judgment is the judgment as to whether the husband
should be held legally responsible for the damage. If proximate
cause is indeed “responsible cause,” as in Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts118 (“Prosser and Keeton”), then because there are
policy reasons for not holding the husband liable, his driving
should not be regarded as the proximate cause. But this is absurd:

116

See supra Part III.G.
See BARRY A. LINDAHL, 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION §§ 28:3,
28:47 (2d ed. 2020).
118 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, at 273.
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the husband’s drunk driving obviously was the proximate cause
of his wife’s injuries.
The same problem exists in cases of sovereign immunity,
diplomatic immunity, contributory negligence, expiration of the
statute of limitations, etc. In these situations, defendants will not
be legally responsible for the harm they proximately caused. On
the realist view, however, the defendants haven’t proximately
caused any harm because, as a matter of policy, they are immune
from liability. Not only is this a mistaken interpretation of the
law, it is a poor prediction of judicial behavior. No judge would
claim that immunity negates causation.
Legal realists might respond by claiming that we have misconstrued their position. Charitably interpreted, realists are not
conflating judgments of proximate causation with judgments of
responsibility. Rather than advancing a semantic thesis, they are
stating a functional one. On this functional interpretation, the
proper way to understand the concept of proximate causation is
to examine its function in judicial rhetoric. Its role, according to
the realists, is to justify results in hard cases. The doctrine gives
judges something to say when they lack the ability or desire to
state explicitly the policy reasons for their conclusions. To use
Professor Green’s analogy, proximate causation functions as “a
joker in the game of poker.”119
On this interpretation, immunity doctrines pose no problems
for the realist. In intrafamily tort cases, for example, the reason
why the defendant is not held responsible for the harm negligently caused is simple and easily given, namely, the parties are
family members. Not being a hard case, there is no need to resort
to the doctrine of proximate causation. A judge need not deny that
the husband’s drunk driving was the proximate cause of the wife’s
injuries because he can deny recovery simply by citing the doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity and showing that it applies in
this case.
Unfortunately, this functional interpretation lacks plausibility. One has to wonder why judges need the doctrine of proximate
causation to justify tough decisions when they already have the
doctrine of duty to do that work. Return to Henningsen.120 If the
court wanted to hide its normative theorizing or found it difficult
to justify its result, it could have simply used the language of duty

119
120

Green, supra note 9, at 612.
See supra text accompanying notes 1–8.
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to accomplish that task. It could have framed the issue as whether
the gun dealer had a duty to protect the infant even after the
mother intervened or whether the duty did not extend that far.
The fact that the court did not do so is mysterious on the functional interpretation. Indeed, the realist position renders it difficult to see why proximate causation cases exist at all. As mentioned earlier, the Third Restatement eliminated the doctrine of
proximate (or legal) cause.121
Thus far, we have considered cases in which there is legal
causation but no legal responsibility. We can also consider cases
in which there is moral responsibility but no legal causation.
These cases would also pose a problem for the realist for legal
judgments of causation are supposed to track moral judgments of
responsibility.
To see this, begin with standard cases of duplicative overdetermination, what we have been calling disjunctive cases. The
usual legal rule is that when two independent, causally sufficient
events occur simultaneously, each can be a proximate cause of a
subsequent harm.122 Thus, when two separate fires join up and
burn down a field, each fire is a proximate cause of the field’s destruction. This is so despite the fact that neither fire is a but-for
cause of the harm. Even if one fire had not been started, the field
would still have been burned down.
Realists seem to have a good explanation for this result. Despite the lack of but-for causation, those who wrongly started the
fires should nevertheless be held responsible for their actions.
The fact that the law accords proximate causation to both disjuncts, therefore, is a plus for realists.
Unfortunately, there is a line of overdetermination cases that
realists cannot explain. Several courts have held that when one
of the independent, causally sufficient events is a normal, natural
event but the other is a wrongful action, the normal event supersedes the wrongful action. In Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul &
Sault Saint Marie Railway Co.,123 for example, the court held that
when two fires simultaneously burn down a building, if one fire
was precipitated by a natural event, it will supersede the other
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See supra text accompanying note 49.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010) (describing the
doctrine of multiple sufficient causes).
123 74 N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898).
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fire started by negligence and will be considered the cause of the
damage.124
From the realist perspective, this result makes little sense. If
judgments of proximate cause are supposed to track responsibility, why would the normal, natural events supersede wrongful actions? To the contrary, wrongdoers should be held responsible for
their actions and hence judged to be the proximate cause.
B. Formalism
Formalism suffers from the same problems as realism. According to the formalists, legal judgments of proximate causation
are the same as folk judgments of causation: they are descriptive
in nature. But the results we explored in Part III suggest that folk
judgments of causation are not descriptive. Rather, they are partially constituted by judgments of norm violations. In conjunctive
cases, we found, the more wrongful an act is, the more it supersedes alternative factors. In disjunctive cases, the opposite is
true: the less wrongful an act is, the more it supersedes alternative factors. In either case, folk judgments are not purely descriptive. They are partly normative.
In this respect, the case law follows suit. Proximate causation
judgments show a telltale correlation with moral judgments: an
action is more likely to be considered the proximate cause of harm
the more wrong it is thought to be. Because descriptive judgments
cannot rationally be determined by normative judgments, formalists cannot explain or condone the case law—which is what realists have claimed all along.
Formalists, of course, have been aware of the correlation between causal and moral judgments. Culpability, as Professor
Moore has recognized, is often an “aphrodisiac to causation.”125
According to Moore, however, these cases are mistaken.126 The
wrongness of an action is relevant to whether the defendant has
breached a duty; it has no bearing on whether the defendant’s
breach caused the harm. To think otherwise is indefensible, for
no plausible theory of morality or causation can attribute causal
efficacy to moral properties. “[T]his view would require us to
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See id. at 566.
MOORE, supra note 50, at 135.
126 See id. at 137 (“Such cases should be considered to be a kind of understandable mistake—understandable because often we cloud our judgment on one issue by our fervor on
another, but a mistake because we have no need to double-count our culpability judgments.”).
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think that moral qualities like culpability can also causally contribute . . . to earthquakes and train wrecks.”127
Formalism, therefore, cannot be faulted for its inability to
justify the correlation of causal with moral judgments. To the contrary, any theory that vindicates judicial behavior in such cases
must itself be rejected. “If one finds the needed metaphysics to be
too implausible to be even seriously considered, then one should
reject those cases (and the doctrines they announce) that would
impose this demand on legal causation.”128
This response, unfortunately, misses the mark. To see this,
recall the distinction introduced earlier between causal contribution and causal selection.129 As we argued, a theory of proximate
causation is a theory of causal selection—it selects which of the
indefinitely many events that causally contributes to the production of some harm counts as the cause. Existing theories in cognitive science suggest that morality is a determinant of causal selection. They do not make the absurd claim that the moral
properties of an action causally contribute to the occurrence of effects; rather, they maintain that the degree to which an action
counts as the cause of the subsequent outcome depends in part on
the degree to which it violates norms.
Professors H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honoré offered a different
response. Rather than run away from these cases, they attempted
to explain these decisions in a formalist fashion. To do so, Hart
and Honoré invoked two principles that they claimed govern causation both inside and outside the law. The first principle is their
famous thesis that voluntary human acts are intervening events
that break causal chains.130 On Hart and Honoré’s interpretation,
our common-sense conceptions of agency and causation treat voluntary actions as uncaused causes. Because these events are the
product of a free, uncaused will, they necessarily sever the causal
connection between themselves and preceding events. Thus, if I
toss a cigarette in the bramble and before the fire peters out someone pours gasoline on the smoldering site, the latter voluntary
action breaks the causal chain and I am no longer the proximate
cause of whatever fire and damage ensues.
The second principle adduced by Hart and Honoré is that actions that are so abnormal as to be contrary to human nature
127
128
129
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See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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count as intervening events which break causal chains.131 Such
actions are akin to animal behavior. Just as unforeseeable animal
behaviors sever causal connections, highly abnormal human actions intervene and break causal chains.
Hart and Honoré used the first principle to show why negligent actions do not break causal chains. Consider Thompson v.
Fox,132 in which a driver negligently ran over the plaintiff with his
car, causing a hip fracture.133 When the plaintiff was taken to the
hospital for treatment, his doctor allegedly “carelessly and improperly treated the fracture,” causing pain and requiring further
surgeries.134
The court held that the doctor’s negligence was not a superseding cause.135 On Hart and Honoré’s view, the doctor’s malpractice did not intervene between the harm and the driver’s previous
negligence because the doctor’s actions were not voluntary:
“Every merely negligent act is non-voluntary in our sense, since
by hypothesis the actor did not intend the consequence.”136 Because the doctor did not intend to harm the patient, his malpractice was not voluntary and hence did not supersede the original
negligence.
Having explained why negligence does not break causal
chains, Hart and Honoré proceeded to explain why gross negligence does. Consider Purchase v. Seelye,137 in which a railroad employee suffered a hernia on the right side of his groin as the result
of the railroad’s alleged negligence. When the employee was
taken to the hospital, the surgeon confused him with another hernia patient and operated on the left side instead.138 The court held
that the doctor’s gross negligence intervened between the railroad’s negligence and the employee’s harm.139 According to Hart
and Honoré, the doctor’s actions were superseding events because
gross negligence is highly abnormal and highly abnormal actions,
on the second principle, break causal chains.140
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See id. at 166.
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See id. at 108.
Id.
See id. at 109.
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Id. at 413.
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Hart and Honoré’s response, however, is ad hoc. Only in a
very forced sense is negligent action “non-voluntary.” In Thompson, the doctor wasn’t sleepwalking; his hands were not being manipulated by another doctor; nor was he being coerced by some
thug. He acted freely, if incompetently. Moreover, as Moore has
pointed out, treating negligent action as nonvoluntary is at odds
with the libertarian justification that Hart and Honoré adduce for
their first principle.141 If voluntary actions break causal chains because they are uncaused causes, how can negligent actions not
break causal chains as well? On a libertarian framework, negligent acts are just as uncaused as nonnegligent ones. Indeed, the
doctor is morally responsible for his malpractice precisely because
he caused his negligent actions.
Hart and Honoré’s use of their second principle to explain
cases like Purchase is also highly artificial. It is implausible to
claim that gross malpractice is so abnormal as to be contrary to
human nature and akin to animal behavior.142 Serious stupidity
is, alas, all too human.
It should come as no surprise that Hart and Honoré’s explanation of the case law is stilted. Consider the difficult challenge
they faced. Given their formalist commitments, Hart and Honoré
could not explain the difference between cases of negligence and
gross negligence in the most obvious manner, namely, by pointing
out that gross negligence is morally worse than negligence. Because they were precluded from appealing to moral distinctions,
Hart and Honoré were forced to devise some descriptive difference to account for the cases. Their characterization of negligence
as “nonvoluntary” and gross negligence as “contrary to human nature” is surely artificial, but it is doubtful that there is a better
way to hammer the square descriptive pegs into the round moral
holes.143
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See MOORE, supra note 50, at 237–40.
Treating gross negligence as highly abnormal is not only artificial; in most instances, it would render the first principle redundant. If gross negligence is highly abnormal, then intentional wrongdoing must be even more so. The doctor who stabs his patient
because he is love with the patient’s wife would be the proximate cause of the patient’s
death not only because the stabbing is a voluntary act; it would also break any previous
causal chain because it is highly abnormal.
143 For further criticism of Hart and Honoré’s account of proximate causation, see
Stapleton, supra note 51, at 461–65.
142

2021]

Proximate Cause Explained

209

V. FOLK JUDGMENTS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS
Now that all of the pieces are in place, we can introduce our
own positive proposal. We suggest that legal judgments of proximate cause are based, at least for the most part, on people’s ordinary concept of causation. Roughly speaking, for any causal factor
C of the causal structure S leading to harm H, C is the legal cause
of H if and only if C is the ordinary cause of H.
As we argued in Part III, this strategy of tying legal judgments to ordinary judgments of causation will work only if we use
a dichotomous notion of cause. To do so, we rendered the ordinary
notion of cause in terms of supersession. We suggested that C is
the cause of H if C supersedes all other events of S. Putting these
two ideas together, we get: C is the legal cause of H if C supersedes all other elements of S.
Finally, we must distinguish between conjunctive and disjunctive cases. Recall that in conjunctive cases, C (weakly and
strongly) supersedes all other alternative causal factors in S if
and only if C is more abnormal than all other events in S.144 Thus,
in conjunctive cases, we get the simple formula: C is the legal
cause of H if C is more abnormal that all other elements of S.
As noted at the end of Part III, disjunctive cases are more
complicated because of the distinction between weak and strong
supersession. In disjunctive cases the more normal an event is,
the more likely it will weakly, but not strongly, supersede all
other events. Thus, whether the normality of an event makes it
more likely to be the cause of harm in disjunctive cases depends
on whether the ordinary notion of cause tracks weak, but not
strong, supersession.
If the ordinary notion of cause tracks weak supersession,
then in disjunctive cases, C is the legal cause of H only if C is more
normal than all other elements of S. But if the ordinary notion of
cause tracks strong supersession, then the greater normality of
an event does not make it more likely to be the legal cause of H.
***
Before we go on to test these proposals against the case law,
we should pause to consider a puzzle. We claim that legal judgments of proximate cause are based on judgments of normality.
But why does the law care about normality?
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See supra Part III.G.
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It makes sense for the law to care about normality, we suggest, because normality gives us a sense of which possibilities a
reasonable agent would have taken account of before acting. Consider the position of a defendant before she decided to act. Which
decision she ought to take depends on what other agents will do,
as well as on various other background conditions. But she can’t
possibly consider all possible ways these other things can be. Nor
should she have to. It’s not her responsibility to consider every
possibility and take precautions against all conceivable harms.
She is not under an absolute duty to safeguard the physical security of everyone else.
Our suggestion is that a reasonable agent would consider the
normal ways things could be. First consider statistical norms. The
more likely something is to happen, the more important it is for
the defendant to consider it. If she contemplates throwing a burning cigarette on the ground, she should anticipate the normal possibilities that might follow upon such an action. If a storm is approaching, will the wind whip up to spread the fire? If near a gas
station, will fumes waft by to cause an explosion? If there has
been a drought, are the leaves on the ground very dry and liable
to burst into flames? These are all scenarios that a reasonable
person would consider—not only because they are harmful, but
normal in the circumstances. It would be unreasonable for the defendant to worry about an oil geyser erupting from the ground or
an airplane dropping tinder from above. While they are logical
possibilities, they are so unlikely that a reasonable person need
not take them into account or take precautions against them. Requiring people to take such precautions would be unfair—it would
impose crushing burdens on everyone to protect the security of
everyone else.
This same suggestion also applies to prescriptive norms.
Other things being equal, the greater the wrong a person might
commit, the less others need to take this possibility into account.
If a defendant is driving, she ought to contemplate the possibility
that the driver in front of her might make a mistake. The driver
might accidentally jam on the breaks. Or that driver might negligently ram into the car in front of her. The defendant needs to
consider these possibilities because human beings are fallible.
She ought to give herself a safe driving distance to avoid an accident if the driver in front mistakenly stops.
But there are limits to the defendant’s responsibility to safeguard others from wrongdoing. The defendant may be driving
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through a high-crime area, but is not under a duty to bulletproof
her car. Nor does she have to give extra room to the vehicle in
front just in case the passengers open fire on a rival gang. These
behaviors are too abnormal—not in the statistical sense we previously considered, but in the moral sense. It is unfair to require
people to take precautions against the highly immoral actions of
others. To do so would be to shift the cost of highly abnormal
behavior from wrongdoers to innocent bystanders.
Thus the notion of normality—which seems to play such a
key role in people’s ordinary causal judgments—seems to be
tracking something of real normative significance.145 Indeed, we
(tentatively) suggest in the next Part that judgments about what
a reasonable agent ought to take into account might actually be
impacting representations of normality that play a role in some
causal judgments.
VI. TESTING THE MODEL
The key test of this proposal is the degree to which it fits the
patterns in existing case law. As we have seen, findings from cognitive science point to some surprising patterns in people’s ordinary causal judgments. If we are right in suggesting that legal
judgments of proximate cause are based on these ordinary causal
judgments, one should expect to find those same surprising patterns in the former.
Of course, there is no real hope that an account like ours will
explain absolutely everything about the patterns observed in legal judgments. No matter how much it successfully explains,
there will inevitably be other factors that play at least some role,
and a full account of the patterns in proximate cause judgments
will have to take these other factors into account as well. Most
importantly for present purposes, there may be certain unusual
cases in which a straightforward application of the ordinary concept of causation would lead to results that are unacceptable from
a policy perspective. In such cases, it may happen that the courts
override their criteria for proximate cause judgment and make a
special exception for policy reasons.

145 According to the Third Restatement, “[a]n actor’s liability is limited to those harms
that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 2010). Since the risks that make an actor’s conduct tortious
are those that a reasonable person would consider and take precautions against, our normality proposal tracks the recommendation of the Third Restatement.

212

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:165

Consider, for example, the old “first building” rule adopted by
New York, in which a defendant is only responsible for the first
building burned down by a negligently started fire, but not for
other structures that may have subsequently caught fire.146
Clearly, the limitation on causation to the first building was motivated by policy considerations. New York law at the time regarded the imputation of the cost of the entire town to one person
to be too great a burden. Any acceptable theory should allow for
these situations where policy is the dog that is wagging the proximate cause tail.
Note, however, that the suggestion we are making here is significantly different from the traditional realist view. On the traditional realist view, all proximate cause judgments are basically
matters of policy, and attempts to explain such judgments in
terms of the criteria governing the concept of causation are nothing more than window dressing. By contrast, on the present proposal, almost all proximate cause judgments are really applications of the criteria governing the ordinary concept of causation.
Then there are certain rare cases in which these criteria would
lead to absurd or unacceptable results, and in those exceptional
cases, the courts do something different from what they usually
do: they override the usual criteria and make a judgment based
on policy. Thus, the prediction of the present proposal is not that
absolutely all cases will be decided in accordance with the ordinary concept of causation. It is rather that almost all cases will
be decided in this way, and that the only exceptions will be cases
in which a straightforward application of the criteria governing
the ordinary concept would lead to unacceptable results.
It bears emphasizing that in these exceptional cases, courts
are almost always explicit about the fact that they are making a
decision based on policy considerations. When the doctrine of
proximate causation is merely window dressing, courts say so. In
justifying the first building rule, for example, the court in Ryan v.
N.Y. Central Railroad Co.,147 wrote:
To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by
fire, but that he must guaranty the security of his neighbors
on both sides, and to an unlimited extent, would be to create
a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized society. . . . To neglect such precaution, and to call upon his
146
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neighbor, on whose premises a fire originated, to indemnify
him instead, would be to award a punishment quite beyond
the offense committed.148
***
To assess our proposal, we turn to the case law. Unfortunately, we cannot test the adequacy of our model against current
legal doctrine. Given the literally thousands of opinions in state
and federal jurisdictions that are relevant to determining the doctrine of proximate causation, a complete analysis of the case law
is beyond the scope of this Article.
To render the discussion tractable, we adopt three major restrictions. First, we focus on proximate cause in torts, in particular the tort of negligence. Second, we explore the cases and analysis
set out in the latest edition of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts. Prosser and Keeton is not only the classic treatise on tort
law, but it adopts an avowedly realist methodology. Using a
highly respected hornbook that adopts a different approach from
our own minimizes the danger of cherry picking, i.e., choosing the
cases we discuss to fit our own model.
Third, we limit our discussion of the case law to two doctrines.
For conjunctive cases, we focus on intervening causation. In cases
of intervening causation, the defendant’s causally insufficient act
combines with another causally insufficient event occurring later
in time to cause harm. The question in these cases is whether the
latter event breaks the causal chain and supersedes the defendant’s
earlier action as proximate cause. Thus, the Henningsen case is
one of intervening causation: the gun owner causally contributed
to the shooting of Henningsen by selling the gun to a thirteenyear-old, but the mother’s ineffective hiding contributed as well.149
In our model, one event supersedes another in conjunctive
cases just when the former is more abnormal than the latter. Our
model will fit the case law, then, if the cases hold that (1) more
abnormal events supersede and (2) equally normal events do not
supersede. Thus, Henningsen fits our model because the mother’s
ineffective hiding of the gun was (roughly) as normal as the shop
owner’s sale of the gun to a minor, and hence the mother’s actions
do not supersede.

148
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Id. at 216–17.
See Henningsen, 230 N.Y.S. at 315–17.
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In disjunctive cases, we cannot examine instances of intervening causation because there are none. If one sufficient cause
occurs before another (e.g., one fire burns down a building before
another fire arrives), the first sufficient cause is the cause of the
event. We therefore consider cases of so-called concurrent causation (i.e., where two causally sufficient events co-occur, as when
two intentionally created fires burn down a building
simultaneously).
Testing our hypothesis in disjunctive cases, however, is more
complex than the conjunctive cases because strong and weak supersession come apart in these cases. Ignoring that complication
for the moment, we will say that our model fits the case law if the
cases hold that (1) less abnormal events supersede and (2) equally
normal events do not supersede. The law governing simultaneous
arson, for example, fits our model because both are equally abnormal and hence do not supersede each other, which is precisely
what the law dictates. (Whether more normal intervening events
legally supersede less normal events depends on whether weak
supersession counts for the purposes of ordinary causation—more
on this in Part III.)
A. Intervening Causation
Prosser and Keeton sets out the fundamental principle that it
claims governs all proximate cause cases: foreseeable events do
not supersede. “Foreseeable intervening forces are within the
scope of the original risk. . . . The courts are quite generally
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category
will not supersede the defendant’s responsibility.”150 When a foreseeable cause occurs, it does not break the causal chain between
the original wrongful act and the later damage. The original
wrongful act remains the proximate cause of the harm.
In its discussion of intervening causation, Prosser and Keeton
attempts to explain why cases come out the way they do—why
some intervening events supersede, while others do not—purely
in terms of foreseeability. We will follow Prosser and Keeton’s order of presentation, analyzing cases in the order that they raise
them.
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1. Negligence.
Prosser and Keeton begins by identifying two kinds of foreseeable events that do not supersede: natural events and negligent
actions.151 Foreseeable natural events include “usual wind or
rain,” “that animals which are loose will wander into danger,” and
“that mosquitos will breed in a swamp.”152 None of these events
supersede the defendant’s liability. If the defendant negligently
starts a fire and a normal wind spreads it, the intervening wind
does not supersede the negligent act. The defendant is still the
proximate cause of the fire damage.
The second set of events that intervene but do not supersede
are negligent actions. These include driving into a car parked on
a highway without its lights on or negligently throwing a match
on spilt gasoline.153 These acts do not break causal chains: if the
defendant parked the darkened car or spilled the gasoline, she
remains the proximate cause of the resulting harm regardless of
the intervening negligence. Henningsen, too, falls into the same
pattern: the mother’s negligence in hiding her son’s air rifle was
foreseeable and hence does not supersede the gun owner’s original
sale to the minor.
According to Prosser and Keeton, negligent actions do not
break causal chains because they are foreseeable.154 They fully
recognize the precariousness of their claim. Not all negligent actions seem foreseeable—in the sense of being statistically normal.
Consider Matthews v. Porter,155 cited by Prosser and Keeton.156
Grover Porter drove negligently and collided with a car on a highway. Jacqueline Matthews, a bystander, stopped at the accident
scene to help Porter’s wife who was injured. Meanwhile, two cars
slid sideways as the result of another instance of negligent driving further up the highway. One of those cars crushed Matthews.
The court held that the second intervening negligence—the second accident leading to cars sliding sideways down the highway—
did not supersede the Porter’s original act of negligence.157

151 It also briefly discusses a third category: foreseeable criminal intervening acts. See
infra Part V.A.5.
152 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 304.
153 Id. § 44, at 305.
154 See id. § 44, at 304.
155 124 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1962).
156 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 306 n.50.
157 See Matthews, 124 S.E.2d at 327.
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To deal with the implausibility of this statistical claim,
Prosser and Keeton distinguishes between two different senses of
foreseeability. The first sense of foreseeability refers to what
would have been “contemplated by any reasonable person in the
place of the defendant at the time of the conduct.”158 A negligent
driver should foresee, in this sense, that his driving may cause an
accident. The second is a broader notion, one that has “undergone
[a] process of dilution and attenuation,” and has to do not with
what the party should literally “have in mind,” but with what is
“foreseeable in the sense that any event which is not abnormal
may reasonably be expected to occur now and then, and would be
recognized as not highly unlikely if it did suggest itself to the actor’s mind.”159 Examples of the second, broadened sense of foreseeability include foreseeing that a potential accident caused by
one’s negligent driving will in turn cause a second, subsequent
collision160—a fact pattern similar (but not identical) to the one in
Matthews.
Prosser and Keeton concedes that this broadened use of foreseeability has “traveled a long way from its original meaning,” but
nevertheless justifies its use by suggesting that it’s merely “a
pointless quibble over the meaning of a term to debate whether
such normal intervening causes are to be called ‘foreseeable.’” 161
In our model, by contrast, foreseeability plays an important,
but not exclusive, role. For natural events, foreseeability matters
because foreseeable events are statistically normal. Since these
intervening events are normal, they are not more abnormal than
the original negligence. Thus, our model correctly predicts that
the liability of the original defendant will not be superseded.
Our model, however, treats negligent actions not as foreseeable (i.e., statistically normal), but rather as morally abnormal.
But since they are generally not more abnormal than the original—also negligent—act of the defendant, they do not supersede.
Recall our original puzzle in Henningsen.162 There, both the gun
dealer and the mother acted negligently: the dealer in illegally
selling the gun to the boy, and the mother in hiding the gun where
the boy could find it. But because the subsequent act of the
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KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 306.
Id. § 44, at 306–07.
See id. § 44, at 306.
Id. § 44, at 306–07.
See supra text accompanying notes 7–13.
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mother was, though negligent, not more negligent than the original wrongdoing of the dealer, it does not break the causal chain.
Indeed, our model helps to account for this “apparent confusion.” Prosser and Keeton cites cases, such as Henningsen, where
parents fail to protect their children from dangerous items sold to
them. Prosser and Keeton describes two versions of such a case:
(1) the parents negligently failed to learn about the dangerous object, and (2) the parents learned about the object but negligently
failed to hide it successfully (as in Henningsen).163 The “apparent
confusion” lies in the fact that, in the first kind of case, the parental failure does not supersede and the defendant uniformly is held
liable.164 But in the second kind of case, the result varies. Indeed,
some such latter cases come out the other way from Henningsen:
when the parents knew about the nature of the object but still
failed to hide it, the failure supersedes and the original seller is
absolved of liability.165
Our account can explain the difference in these cases by the
margin of relative negligence involved. If the parents did not suspect the dangerous nature of the object, then their failure to hide
it, though negligent, is not more norm-violating than the actions
of the seller who knowingly sold a dangerous object to a child. But
in the second case, the issue will come down to the particular facts
in determining who, among the parties aware of the dangerous
object, was more abnormal: the parent who failed to hide it or the
person who sold it in the first place. In some cases, the parent’s
failure is deemed more abnormal than the seller and the failure
supersedes. But in cases like Henningsen, when the danger of the
object was arguably “so extreme that the defendant could not reasonably rely upon even the parent to protect the child,”166 the
seller intuitively behaved at least as negligently as the parent, if
not more so, and so their sale is not superseded by the parental
negligence.
2. Rescue.
Prosser and Keeton next addresses the “rescue doctrine,” under which efforts to save someone or something from an original
wrongdoer typically do not supersede.167 As it notes, the rescue
163
164
165
166
167

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 318.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. § 44, at 307.
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doctrine does not fit the foreseeability model: “Whether or not the
rescuer is to be regarded as ‘foreseeable’, it has been recognized
since the early case of the crowd rushing to assist the descending
balloonist that the rescuer is nothing abnormal.”168
Indeed, cases of rescue are unusually severe in preserving,
and even extending, the liability of the original defendant. For
instance, the defendant may have an independent duty of care to
protect the rescuer, even when the defendant endangers only his
own safety, as in an attempted suicide. The defendant may be liable even if the rescuer harms not only themselves, but the person
rescued or a third party. Most courts extend the duty of care to
rescued property, even if it is the defendant’s property. There
have even been cases of recovery to a rescuer of a rescuer of property.169 And the original defendant may be liable even when “defensive efforts may be negligent, and so may endanger others. It
is only when they are so utterly foolhardy and extraordinary that
. . . they will be considered a superseding cause.”170
Our model provides an explanation for why rescue cases tend
to be so broad in preserving the causal relation between the original negligent actor and the eventual harm: those who rescue a
victim are generally acting laudably, and therefore the rescue is
generally less morally abnormal than the original wrongdoing.
Even when the rescue is itself negligent, it is still not more morally abnormal than the—also negligent—original wrongdoing,
and so does not break the causal chain. Indeed, our model helps
to explain why the bar for superseding negligence in rescue cases
is so high: that is, why only “utterly foolhardy and extraordinary”
negligence will supersede. Because a rescue is regarded as a
prima facie morally laudable action, it makes sense that only a
very high degree of negligence (i.e., recklessness) will render even
a negligent rescue morally worse than the original defendant’s
wrongdoing.
3. Medical malpractice.
Prosser and Keeton describes a similar pattern for medical
malpractice cases: negligence does not supersede, but recklessness does.171 Recall Thompson,172 in which the court held that the
168
169
170
171
172

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 307.
See id. § 44, at 308 nn.66, 68–70, 72–74 (collecting cases).
Id. § 44, at 309.
See id. § 44, at 309–10.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–35.
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doctor’s negligence in treating injuries from a car accident was
not a superseding cause:
Doctors, being human, are apt occasionally to lapse from prescribed standards, and the likelihood of carelessness, lack of
judgment or of skill, on the part of one employed to effect a
cure for a condition caused by another’s act, is therefore considered in law as an incident of the original injury.173
But certain kinds of medical malpractice, including such
“highly unusual varieties” as where a medical professional inflicts
an intentional injury, do break the causal chain.174 For this proposition, Prosser and Keeton cites to the Second Restatement of
Torts, which offers several illustrations of “extraordinary” medical malpractice superseding the original defendant’s liability:
A negligently inflicts serious harm on B. While B is in a hospital under treatment, his nurse, unable to bear the sight of
his intense suffering, gives him a hypodermic injection of
morphine in disobedience of the surgeon’s instructions and so
excessive that she knows it may be lethal. B dies as a result
of the injection. A’s negligence is not a legal cause of B’s
death.
A negligently injures B so severely as to require him to go to
a hospital for treatment. While he is there, his manners annoy C, one of the male nurses, who, in revenge, attacks B. A
is not liable for the harm inflicted by C.175
Prosser and Keeton explains this difference in judicial behavior by
reference to foreseeability. On its view, ordinary malpractice is
foreseeable but extraordinary medical malpractice is
unforeseeable.176
Our model explains this change in judicial behavior by reference to moral normality. In contrast to cases such as Thompson,
in which the medical malpractice is described as “doctors[ ] being
human,”177 the second set involves instances of extraordinary
wrongdoing, going far beyond ordinary negligence. In these second set of cases, in other words, there is a significant moral asymmetry between the original defendant and the intervening
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 108–09.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 309.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 457 illus. 4–5 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 309–10.
Thompson, 192 A. at 108.
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medical practitioner: When the original defendant’s behavior was
merely negligent, the intervening act is either grossly negligent
(as in the first example), or intentional (as in the second example).
Because these intervening acts are more morally abnormal than
the original negligence, our model correctly predicts that they
supersede.
4. Suicide.
Prosser and Keeton next describes cases in which injury inflicted by a defendant leads to the victim’s suicide.178 Here, the case
law divides into two general categories. If the suicide is committed in a state of insanity that “prevents one from realizing the
nature of one’s act or controlling one’s conduct,” then it is typically
deemed to be “a direct result” of that injury “and no intervening
force at all.”179 The insane intervening suicide does not supersede
and thus the original defendant is held liable.
If, on the other hand, the injured person is sane or “in full
command of all faculties” and thus commits suicide as a “voluntary choice,” then the case law once again divides into two categories.180 If the initial injury was inflicted through negligence,
then the (sane) suicide typically supersedes the defendant’s original wrongdoing.181 If, however, the initial injury was intentional,
as in cases of blackmail, rape, or torture, then recovery has been
allowed, even though the injured party was sane at the time of
the suicide.182
Prosser and Keeton offers no explanation for this pattern of
behavior, simply noting that “[s]ome difficulty has arisen” in
these cases.183 Our model can help to account for these divisions
in the case law. We begin by noting that suicides register as statistically abnormal. The current rate of suicide in the United
States is about 0.014%.184 What about its moral abnormality?
Historically, at common law, committing suicide was regarded as both morally and legally wrong.185 Throughout the
178

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 310.
Id. § 44, at 310–11.
180 Id. § 44, at 311.
181 Id.
182 See id. § 44, at 311 n.97.
183 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 310.
184 Suicide Statistics, AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/A8TE-E2NP.
185 Under English common law, suicide was a felony; Blackstone’s Commentaries define “felonious homicide” as “killing one’s self, or another man,” without distinguishing
179
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twentieth century, the legal consequences for suicide were largely
abolished or unenforced186—suggesting that suicide was no longer
regarded as being equally objectionable as other behavior that
continued to be criminalized—but the act remains morally
stigmatized.187
Here, however, we must distinguish between sane and insane
suicides. The moral abnormality can only apply to a sane suicide.
In the insane suicide, where the action is “the same as if one [ ]
hurt oneself during unconsciousness or delirium,”188 any persisting moral stigmatization of suicide would not be expected to apply, since the act is involuntary and unconscious. In these cases,
this unconscious act is not morally worse than the original negligence, and so our model predicts that it will not supersede: exactly
what the case law reflects.
In cases of sane suicides, however, the situation is different.
Where suicide retains its association with moral and, in certain
jurisdictions, criminal wrongdoing, the deliberate and voluntary
choice to kill oneself will be treated as morally more abnormal
than the original negligent act—and indeed suicide tends to supersede in negligence cases.189 But in cases in which the original
injury is itself criminal—such as the blackmail, rape, and torture
cases that Prosser and Keeton mentions190—one would expect that
the suicide, though morally stigmatized, is less morally abnormal
than these egregious wrongdoings.191 And as our model would predict, the original defendant has been held liable in such cases.
In this way, our model allows us to account not just for the
difference between sane and insane suicide cases, but also for the
between suicide and murder. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *188–89.
186 In the United States, suicide remained a common law crime in several states, but
the associated penalties were either abolished or unenforced. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d
861, 864–65 (Va. 1992).
187 See G. Tadros & D. Jolley, The Stigma of Suicide, 179 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 178, 178
(2001) (finding that the present “[s]tigmatisation of suicide has very deep roots in our collective thinking and judgment”). As recently as 1990, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that suicide is legitimized. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
188 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 311.
189 Id. § 44, at 311 n.98.
190 See id. § 44, at 311 n.97 (citing Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal Rptr. 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1960)
(apparent intentional infliction of mental disturbance by blackmail); Stephenson v. State,
179 N.E. 633, 635 (Ind. 1932) (suicide by a rape and torture victim); Cauverien v. De Metz,
188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (“malicious and wilful conversion”)).
191 After all, criminal penalties for suicide have either been abolished or unenforced
in the twentieth century, while acts like blackmail, rape, and torture continue to be crimes.
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difference, within the sane cases, between merely negligent and
intentionally inflicted initial injuries—a difference neither
Prosser and Keeton’s foreseeable/unforeseeable distinction nor
Hart and Honoré’s voluntary/involuntary distinction is able to
explain.
5. Foreseeable means.
Prosser and Keeton next describes an interesting group of
cases in which the harm is foreseeable but the intervening cause
is not.192 For example, suppose someone forgets to clean out the
residue of an oil tank. The tank is hit by a bolt of lightning and
explodes.193 Though the intervening cause is unforeseeable—a
lightning strike is the ultimate unforeseeable event—it is foreseeable that an oil tank with residue will explode.
As Prosser and Keeton notes, the cases split into two groups.
The first set of cases includes not only the lightning case just
mentioned, but also cases involving “a ladder left standing in the
street blown down by an unforeseeable wind; an obstruction in
the highway with which a runaway horse collides; . . . [and] a
termite-riddled telephone pole thrown down by an automobile
which comes up on the sidewalk.”194 In each of these cases, the
ultimate harm, described in general terms, is foreseeable: the
dirty oil tank explodes, the ladder left in the street falls, the rickety pole collapses. What isn’t foreseeable is the specific way in
which the harm comes about. In these cases, the original defendant
is held liable in accordance with the “well settled” rule that “if the
result is foreseeable, the manner in which it is brought about need
not be, and is immaterial.”195
Prosser and Keeton next considers a set of cases that nevertheless contravene this “well settled” rule: cases in which an unforeseeable cause produces a foreseeable result, but in which the
original defendant’s liability is nevertheless superseded.196 For instance, a defendant negligently excavates a dangerous hole in the
sidewalk, but the plaintiff is deliberately pushed into it.197 Or:
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See id. § 44, at 316–18.
See Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1933).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 316–17.
Id. § 44, at 317.
See id. § 44, at 317–18.
E.g., Alexander v. Town of New Castle, 17 N.E. 200, 201 (Ind. 1888).
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[A] chair seat is left on a balcony railing, and it is purposely
thrown down, or a policeman aware of the danger of a live
wire knocks it with a club against the plaintiff, or a stranger
impersonating an elevator operator deliberately invites the
plaintiff to step into an open shaft.198
In all of these cases, the original negligence leads to a result that
is, in general terms, foreseeable, but for which the defendant is
nevertheless not held liable.
Prosser and Keeton says that “[t]he difference between the
two groups of cases is a matter of intangible factors not easy to
express. It apparently lies in the conclusion of the courts that in
the latter type of case the responsibility is shifted to the second
actor.”199 To be sure, the courts conclude that, in the second kind
of case, responsibility is shifted. But why do they so conclude?
Prosser and Keeton continues:
Where there is a malicious or criminal act, the original actor
might be free to say, even if anticipating the misconduct, that
it was not the actor’s concern, whereas the actor might still
be responsible for inadvertence or ignorant blunders. Where
the defendant would be relieved of responsibility even if the
act were to be anticipated, the defendant should be no less
relieved when it is unforeseeable.200
But such an answer merely shifts the question to why the defendant is relieved of responsibility in the latter group of cases, even
if the result were to be anticipated, and not in the former. Prosser
and Keeton offers no answer to this more basic question.
Our model, on the other hand, provides a by-now-familiar explanation for the difference between these two sets of cases. The
two sets are similar in statistical abnormality, but not moral abnormality. In the first set of cases, the intervening causes are either instances of negligence (like the pole and ladder struck by
passing automobiles, or the pile of lumber knocked over by a
passerby) or natural events (like a lightning strike, a sudden
wind, or a termite infestation). So in each of these instances, the
intervening cause is either equal to or less morally abnormal than
the original negligence of the defendant—as the model predicts,
such intervening causes do not supersede. But in the second set
198 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 317–18 (citing Cole v. German Sav. & Loan
Soc’y, 214 F. 113 (8th Cir. 1903)).
199 Id. § 44, at 318.
200 Id.
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of cases, the intervening causes are “malicious or criminal acts”
(such as shoving the plaintiff into a hole, or striking a person with
a live wire), and are therefore more morally abnormal than the
original defendant’s negligence. In these cases, the model predicts—and the case law bears out—that the intervening cause
will supersede the defendant’s liability.201
Our model thus provides a uniform and consistent set of explanations for the variations of judicial behavior present in the
intervening cause doctrine that Prosser and Keeton describes. Its
chief explanatory notion of abnormality allows it to account for
features of the case law that Prosser and Keeton’s preferred tool
of foreseeability is unable fully to explain.
6. Problematic cases.
Finally, there are two categories of cases which, in our model,
require some special treatment. The first involves intervening
causes that are both statistically and morally more abnormal
than the original negligence and yet fail to supersede. Examples
include: a hotel held liable for jewelry burgled from its negligently
unlocked safe;202 a contractor held liable for failing to maintain
proper barricades, even when those barricades were wrongfully
removed by a third party;203 a school held liable for the rape of a
negligently unsupervised child in a school gym;204 and a railroad
held liable for the rape of a passenger negligently dropped off at
an unsafe location.205 Our model, however, predicts the opposite
201 Prosser and Keeton says that the same “suggestion”—that is, that “[w]here the
defendant would be relieved of responsibility even if the act were to be anticipated, the
defendant should be no less relieved when it is unforeseeable”—may be applied to “resolve
the apparent confusion” in two further types of cases: first, Henningsen-like cases in which
an intervening party fails to protect a child from a dangerous object procured from the
defendant; and second, cases in which a third party “fully discovers” the dangerous nature
of the object sold by the defendant, and deliberately inflicts this danger on the plaintiff.
Id. We’ve argued above that while their “suggestion” just pushes the question of responsibility further back, our model supplies a genuine explanation; this explanation applies
equally well to these two further types of cases. We discussed the Henningsen-like cases
above. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text. Our model provides a similar explanation for the second type of case: where the third party is fully aware of the danger
and nevertheless deliberately inflicts it on the plaintiff, the moral abnormality of that intervening cause is higher than the moral abnormality of the original, merely negligent
defendant.
202 See Wallinga v. Johnson, 131 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Minn. 1964).
203 See J.H. Welch & Son Contracting Co. v. Gardner, 392 P.2d 567, 569 (Ariz. 1964)
(en banc).
204 McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 361 (Wash. 1953) (en banc).
205 Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690, 691–92 (Va. 1921) (en banc).
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of these cases: if the intervening cause is more abnormal, then it
should supersede and break the causal chain, relieving the original wrongdoer of liability.
It should also be noted that courts themselves recognize the
exceptional nature of these cases. Despite the fact that criminality normally supersedes the original negligence, courts routinely
point out that criminality does not supersede when the original
duty was to protect against the harm that was realized. For example, in Hines v. Garrett,206 a train conductor forgot to stop at a
station and left off an eighteen-year-old girl on the tracks a half
mile away at night.207 As she walked back on the tracks, she was
raped by two different men. The Virginia Supreme Court ruled
against the railroad, writing that the rule “that no responsibility
for a wrong attaches whenever an independent act of a third person intervenes between the negligence complained of and the injury . . . does not apply where the very negligence alleged consists
of exposing the injured party to the act causing the injury.”208 Similarly, in McLeod v. Grant County School District No. 128,209 holding a school responsible for failing to protect a student from being
raped in the gymnasium, the court cited the Second Restatement:
“If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes
the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for harm caused thereby.”210
One response to cases of this type would be to concede that
the pattern of folk judgments of causation does not explain the
law, but to argue that these cases are the rare circumstances in
which policy considerations trump the doctrine of proximate causation. After all, it would be absurd to absolve a bailor of responsibility for not locking a safe just because a thief later stole the
jewelry entrusted to him. Isn’t the job of the bailor specifically to
stop thieves from stealing valuables? To insist on proximate cause
206
207
208
209
210

108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921) (en banc).
See id. at 691.
Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
255 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953) (en banc).
Id. at 365 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (AM. L. INST. 1965)).

It would not be enough for a builder to fence off a part of the walk because it was
in a dangerous condition, and then give it no more attention. He knows the probabilities of the removal of the barrier by mischievous or disorderly persons, and
he should exercise reasonable care to see that it is in place.
J.H. Welch & Son, 392 P.2d at 571.
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would make it impossible to hold guardians responsible for their
negligence.
We, however, prefer a different response. We believe that legal judgments in these cases do in fact reflect folk judgments of
causation.211 The problem is just that existing empirical theories
of folk judgments of causation fail to capture correctly the effect
that arises in these cases. Existing empirical theories therefore
ought to be modified in the special case where the original wrong
committed was a violation of a protective duty. In the modified
account, morally abnormal intervening causes supersede less
morally abnormal ones, except when the original wrong was the
violation of a protective duty.
While there are not yet any studies that back up this modification, we believe it fits with the basic motivation of the model
described above. After all, the core motivation behind this model
was the assumption that people tend not to consider counterfactuals in which agents perform actions that violate norms. This
assumption may hold in general, but we hypothesize that it does
not hold in this specific case in which people are focusing on a
duty that exists only because of the possibility that other agents
may violate a norm. For example, it may be a general fact about
people’s cognition that they tend not to consider possibilities in
which agents violate moral norms by stealing objects from a safe.
However, in this specific case in which people are considering a
bailor who is obligated to keep a safe locked because of the possibility of theft, they would be strongly drawn to consider that sort
of possibility, and the act of stealing from the safe would then fail
to supersede. Clearly, this is an empirical hypothesis—much like
the many empirical hypotheses that have already been explored
within the cognitive science literature on folk judgments of causation—and it could be put to the test using those same methods.
We can also see why the law would make exceptions to the
standard rule about normality in these cases. As we argued in
Part V, normality gives us a sense of which possibilities a reasonable agent would have taken account of before acting. But when
reasonable agents are subject to a protective duty, they must take
into account norm violations whose very possibility is the ground
of the protective duty. Thus, it would be unreasonable for a bailor
entrusted with protective jewels not to consider the possibility

211 In our model, folk judgments of causation are normatively inflected by judgments
of normality, but not by every policy consideration that affects responsibility.
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that someone might want to steal those jewels—even though, indeed especially because, this behavior is morally abnormal.
The second set of outlier cases involves intervening causes
that are morally less abnormal than the original negligence, and
yet nevertheless do supersede. In Goneau v. Minneapolis, St. Paul
& Sault Saint Marie Railway Co.,212 the brakeman went to fix a
defective coupling between two cars. As he was repairing the
mechanism, he fell and severely injured himself.213 The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the defective coupling was not the proximate cause of the brakeman’s injuries.214 This result runs counter
to our model because the brakeman’s fall was morally less abnormal than the original negligence and yet this intervening cause
breaks the causal chain, absolving the railroad of responsibility.
Or consider so-called “dart out” cases. In these instances,
speeding motorists are not held liable for striking children that
suddenly dart onto roads, even though the possibility of such accidents is generally foreseeable.215 Again, this result is inconsistent with our model because the morally less abnormal action
of the darting child supersedes the illegal actions of the driver.
Call these “pure coincidence” cases. In such situations, the
intervening causes are not the type of events that raises the likelihood of harm. These events merely make the injury possible by
ensuring that the original wrong and the victim co-occur in space
and time. The negligent installation of defective couplings in
Goneau is not the kind of event that raises the probability that
brakemen will fall from trains. It merely serves to place the
brakeman in a spot where his falling leads to injury. Likewise, in
the dart out cases, the speed simply places the car at the spot to
hit the child—this is a pure coincidence, not something that
makes it more likely that children will be hit.216
212

191 N.W. 279 (Minn. 1922).
See id. at 279.
214 See id. at 281.
215 See, e.g., Howk v. Anderson, 253 N.W. 32, 32 (Iowa 1934); Burlie v. Stephens, 193
P. 684, 685 (Wash. 1920). Though the court in Howk found that the motorist was not bound
to anticipate the child darting out, Prosser and Keeton describes such cases as ones in
which the risk is generally foreseeable. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 305–06.
216 For an influential discussion of the relationship between an act and the corresponding likelihood of a particular injury, see generally Guido Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71
(1975). Then-Professor Calabresi described the notion of “causal link,” which obtains between an act and an injury when we believe that the act “will increase the chances that
the injury will also occur.” Id. In Calabresi’s terminology, what we have been calling pure
coincidence cases are those in which no causal link obtains between the act and the injury.
213
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Of course, pure coincidence cases violate Prosser and Keeton’s
model as well. Intervening causes supersede even when foreseeable. Prosser and Keeton explains away these cases by pointing out
that the defendant’s actions did not increase the risk of the particular outcome—in Prosser and Keeton’s terminology, the defendant’s conduct had not “created or increased an unreasonable risk
of harm through its intervention,” and so the resulting harm was
outside “the scope of the [original] risk.”217 Prosser and Keeton
never explains why intervening events must increase the risk of
harm in order to count as proximate cause. The treatise simply
assumes it to be self-evident.
To explain why less abnormal events supersede the original
wrongdoing in pure coincidence cases we rely on a policy-based
argument. The law absolves the original wrongdoer of responsibility when their actions are not the kind that increases the risk
of injury to ensure that the liability of the wrongdoer is not unfairly extended. If the law were to hold wrongdoers liable even
when their actions did not increase the risk of injury, it would be
treating the wrongdoer as the insurer of every person injured once
the wrongdoing happened.218
Consider the comments of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Goneau. The court argued that the plaintiff’s request for compensation “would lead to surprising results.”219 The railroad would be
responsible not just when the brakeman fell when trying to fix
the coupling. It would be liable even trying to get to the coupling
and get back:
[I]t would make the defendant liable if plaintiff had slipped
and fallen while walking alongside the train in going from or
returning to the caboose. Defendant would become an insurer
of plaintiff’s safety from the moment the train broke in two
until after it had been reunited and was on its way again.220
Absolving the original wrongdoer in coincidence cases,
therefore, is akin to the New York practice of releasing the negligent fire setter of liability for any but the first building burning
down. The law of proximate causation diverges from folk judgments of causation in rare cases when there are especially strong
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KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 44, at 303–07.
Cf. Calabresi, supra note 216, at 78 (arguing that the requirement of a causal link
for liability is “crucial” with respect to the objective of effective deterrence).
219 Goneau, 191 N.W. at 281.
220 Id.
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policy reasons not to impose liability. In these situations, even
though there has been a breach of duty, which was the proximate
cause of the injuries, the law refrains from imposing liability. As
the court in Goneau explained, liability in coincidence cases would
amount to holding the wrongdoer to be “an insurer of plaintiff’s
safety.”221 Such a burden is so onerous that even a reasonable person would not expend efforts to guard against it.
B. Concurrent Causation
Having compared Prosser and Keeton’s treatment of intervening causation to our own model, we now move to its discussion of
concurrent causation. In concurrent causation, two independent
and causally sufficient events co-occur and a certain result is produced. The legal question is whether each of these events counts
as a cause.
Prosser and Keeton begins its discussion of concurrent causation by noting that the but-for test for factual causation fails in
these cases.222 If two fires, each sufficient in itself, burn down a
house, neither is a but-for cause of the damage. Extinguish one
fire and the house still burns to the ground. Nevertheless, both
fires are the cause of the damage—according to folk judgments
and legal doctrine.
In response to this unwanted result, Prosser and Keeton observes that courts use an alternate method for determining liability in cases of concurrent causation: courts ask not whether the
defendant was a but-for cause of the harm, but rather whether he
was a “substantial factor” in bringing it about.223 But, Prosser and
Keeton cautions, the substantial-factor formulation “can scarcely
be called a test”—courts apply no uniform method for determining
when a factor is substantial, and the phrase is “neither possible
nor desirable to reduce” to more basic terms.224 It thus supplies to
the jury a kind of “sufficiently intelligible” general heuristic for
assigning liability.225
We believe that our model sheds light on how courts use the
substantial-factor judgments in cases of concurrent causation—
or as we call them, disjunctive cases. We can, in other words, subject disjunctive cases to systematic analysis. To show how, we
221
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Id. at 281.
See KEETON, supra note 16, § 41, at 266.
Id. § 41, at 267.
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divide cases into those where each event is equally normal and
those in which one is more normal than the other.
1. Equal normality.
In disjunctive cases, our model predicts that equally normal
concurrent causes should be regarded as equally causal. The case
law straightforwardly bears out our model’s prediction: it holds
that when two causes each “would have been sufficient to cause
the identical result,” it is “clear that neither can be absolved from
that responsibility.”226 For instance, Prosser and Keeton cites Corey
v. Havener,227 in which the plaintiff was injured when his horse
was frightened by two speeding motorcyclists passing on either
side.228 The court held that “[i]t makes no difference that there
was no concert between them, or that it is impossible to determine
what portion of the injury was caused by each.”229 Instead, that
“both of the defendants were wrongdoers” and each was a sufficient cause was enough to hold them both liable.230 This is exactly
what our model predicts: two equally normal—in this case,
equally negligent—concurrent causes are judged to be equally liable for the accident. Like the court in Havener, our model doesn’t
ask which portion of the actual injury is attributable to which of
the causes; it only asks whether the causes are equally normal
and independently sufficient to cause the harm.
2. Unequal normality.
Prosser and Keeton offers several examples in which two concurrent causes, each sufficient to cause the harm, have differing
levels of normality. For instance, “[t]he defendant sets a fire,
which merges with a fire from some other [innocent or unknown]
source; the combined fires burn the plaintiff’s property, but either
one would have done it alone.”231 Or, as in Basko v. Sterling Drug,
Inc.,232 the plaintiff loses eyesight after taking two different drugs,
each of which was sufficient to cause blindness.233 In that case,
one of the drug manufacturers behaved negligently by failing to
226
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228
229
230
231
232
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exercise a duty to warn, while the other had no such duty.234 Thus,
the two sufficient causes had differing levels of normality.
In cases of unequal normality, the general rule is that the
actor who acted wrongly may still be held liable. Prosser and
Keeton says: “[W]hen the negligence of a defendant ‘concurs’ with
an act of God, which is to say an unforeseeable force of nature,
the defendant is to be held liable.”235 Similarly, the Second Restatement provides the example of a house destroyed by the merging of two fires: one set by the negligence of Company A and the
other of unknown or innocent origins.236 According to the Restatement, Company A may be held liable if its negligence is found to
be a “substantial factor” in causing the harm.237
Holding the wrongdoer liable even in cases where his
wrongdoing concurs with an innocent cause seems, from a policy
perspective, to be the right result. As Professor Charles Carpenter wrote in one of the first scholarly articles to examine concurrent causation, “[t]o excuse the defendant from liability where all
the elements of liability required in other cases exist would be to
make the defendant a favorite of the law in the concurrent cause
cases . . . without warrant.”238
Similarly, Professors Fowler Harper and Fleming James
claimed that “negligent conduct will be more effectively deterred
by imposing liability than by giving the wrongdoer a windfall in
cases where an all-sufficient innocent cause happens to concur
with his wrong in producing harm.”239
It is therefore surprising that both courts and legal scholars
have come out the other way: they have held that in cases where
wrongdoing concurs with an innocent cause, there is no liability.
Consider the case of Cook discussed earlier in Part IV.A, in which
234
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a fire started negligently by the defendant combined with another
fire of unknown origin; together, the single merged fire destroyed
the plaintiff’s property.240 The court found that the defendant
could not be held liable, and developed an explicit theory of concurrent causation with an innocent event:
[W]here an injury accrues to a person, by the concurrence of
two causes, one traceable to another person under such circumstances as to render him liable as a wrongdoer, and the
other not traceable to any responsible origin, but is of such
efficient or superior force that it would produce the injury regardless of the responsible cause, there is no legal liability.
No damage in such circumstances can be traced, with reasonable certainty, to wrongdoing as a producing cause. The one
traceable to the wrongdoer is superseded by the other cause
or condition, which takes the place of it and becomes, in a
physical sense, the proximate antecedent of what follows.241
Similarly, New Hampshire Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert Peaslee has argued that in cases in which an “innocent cause
would surely have done the damage” for which the defendant’s
wrongdoing would also have been sufficient, “it is not apparent
how the latter can be considered the cause of the loss. Causation
is matter of fact, and that which is not in fact causal ought not to
be deemed so in law.”242 So long as the innocent act was “so far
complete as to make the result certain to ensue before the defendant’s act became operative,” the defendant cannot be held liable
for his concurrent wrongdoing.243 Professor Peter Cane, in describing English common law, goes even further:
In cases where only one of the factors is legally proscribed
human conduct, the perpetrator of that conduct is allowed to
take advantage of the other factor, whether it is contemporaneous with, precedes or follows the conduct: the law treats

240

See Cook, 74 N.W. at 562.
Id. at 566. The Cook holding was significantly undermined by Kingston v. Chicago
& N.W. Railway Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927), was repudiated by the American Law
Institute in the Restatement of Torts, and has generally failed to be adopted. See KEETON,
supra note 16, § 41, at 267 n.26.
242 Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 H ARV. L. R EV. 1127,
1130 (1934).
243 Id.
241

2021]

Proximate Cause Explained

233

the other factor as the cause in preference to the legally proscribed conduct.”244
In other words, in all those cases where “only one of the factors is
legally culpable human conduct—where, for instance, one is a
‘natural’ event (i.e., an event not traceable to human agency)—
the latter will be treated as the cause.”245
Shielding a wrongdoer from liability when his act concurs
with an innocent cause is the minority position in American law.
The policy reasons of deterring wrongful conduct and avoiding a
windfall for wrongdoers have helped to establish the Restatement
rule: that a wrongdoer may be found to be a “substantial factor”
in causing the harm, and therefore to be held liable, even when
his wrongdoing concurs with an innocent cause.246 Indeed, some
commentators have found the Cook reasoning to be utterly baffling.247 But our model helps to explain why, even in the face of
these significant policy considerations, there is nevertheless a
tendency to see, as the Cook court did, the innocent cause as superseding the wrongdoing.
Recall that in disjunctive cases, more normal events
weakly—but do not strongly—supersede less normal events. In
other words, folk judgments penalize less normal events by
244
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lowering their causal score, but they do not simultaneously raise
the causal score of the more normal event (compared to what they
would have been if both were normal). This weak supersession in
disjunctive cases differs from the strong supersession in conjunctive cases. When an abnormal conjunct supersedes a normal conjunct, the former is not only seen as more causal, but the latter is
seen as less causal (compared to what they would have been if
both were normal).
Yet the disagreement in the case law and scholarly literature
over disjunctive cases of unequal normality may be explained by
an underlying disagreement over the status of weak supersession.
Those who follow the Cook line might hold that weak supersession counts as supersession for the purposes of proximate causation. In other words, because normal events are seen as more
causal than all other factors, they supersede less normal events.
Those who follow the majority view, on the other hand, might hold
that weak supersession is not real supersession. To supersede,
normal events not only have to be seen as more causal than all
other factors, but those other factors also have to be seen as less
causal. In disjunctive cases, however, this is not so—normal
events are seen as more causal, but the causal score of abnormal
events does not change.
C. Summing Up
As we have seen, Prosser and Keeton takes the standard legal
realist line on proximate causation: proximate cause is just another name for “responsible cause.” We have also seen that Prosser
and Keeton has difficulty explaining the case law it describes. In
intervening and concurrent cause cases, its analysis can only be
made to fit judicial decisions by warping or rendering meaningless concepts such as “foreseeability” and “substantial factors.” Indeed, in many cases, Prosser and Keeton simply admits that it
cannot explain the doctrine.
Prosser and Keeton’s analysis of proximate causation raises
an even larger question mentioned earlier: If proximate causation
is just a proxy for judgments of responsibility, why does it even
exist? Courts would seem to be wasting an enormous amount of
time and energy on a meaningless doctrine. It would make more
sense for them to jettison the doctrine and fold all of their discussion into the question of whether a duty existed which had been
breached, as the Third Restatement has done.

2021]

Proximate Cause Explained

235

Our approach, by contrast, explains why proximate cause
cases exist. In these cases, there are simply too many events that
causally contributed to the harm. Since legal responsibility is
pegged to the cause (or causes) of the harm, there is a need to
select from this very large set the appropriate event (or events).
Questions of proximate causation, therefore, are real and urgent:
they ask about the existence of a fact whose obtaining is a necessary condition for holding one of the parties responsible.
We have also shown that folk judgments of causation can explain the legal doctrine as described by Prosser and Keeton. The
case law generally tracks our model in conjunctive and disjunctive cases. No doubt, our model will need to be refined in the future. But we believe we have showed its plausibility, at least as
compared to the realist and formalist positions.
CONCLUSION
Though most scholars have found legal realism’s interpretation of proximate causation irresistible, it is fair to say that many
wished that it weren’t. Legal realism, after all, is unnerving. If
the realists are right and the language of proximate causation is
window dressing for unrestricted moral deliberation about responsibility, it is difficult to see how common law adjudication is
consistent with the rule of law. Judges would not be following
preexisting rules dictating who is responsible for what; they
would be using their own moral sensibilities to determine after
the fact where liability should lie, all the while pretending to be
acting otherwise.
Fortunately, a clear-eyed view of the case law need not delegitimatize common law courts. As we have tried to show, judges
who invoke the doctrine of proximate causation are not pretending to follow the rules. They are doing what the rules tell them to
do, namely, to engage in ordinary causal reasoning. The conclusions of such reasoning are judgments about which actions caused
the relevant harm. These causal judgments are then used as
premises in further deliberation about who is legally responsible
for the harm in question.
The trick, of course, is to recognize that ordinary causal reasoning is not morality-free reasoning. Whether an action will be
selected as the cause of harm normally depends on whether that
action has violated a norm. In this sense, the realists were right:
judicial behavior in proximate cause cases cannot be understood
formalistically. Judges make decisions on the basis of moral
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deliberation. But as we have argued, not all moral deliberation is
the same. Judging that someone’s actions have violated a norm is
not concluding that they are responsible for the harm to which
they causally contributed.
Scholars can now have their cake and eat it too. They can
happily concede to the realist that judges in proximate cause
cases are making moral judgments while siding with the formalist that judges in these cases are also following the rules. And
with both camps they can agree that judges are people too: they
make decisions about causation and responsibility the way we all
do and their opinions capture this familiar form of reasoning, at
least a good portion of the time.
Scholars also have a new tool at their disposal for further
analysis of proximate cause cases: cognitive science. By contrast
to formalists such as Professors Hart and Honoré who used the
methods of mid-century Oxford philosophy—intuition pumping
and ordinary language analysis—legal scholars can use the new
field of cognitive science and the substantial literature it has generated on ordinary judgments of causation. Jurisprudence, therefore, need not confine itself to the armchair—it can run experiments and see how folk judgments line up with the law.

